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Translation, Interpretation, and 
Common Meaning: Victoria   Welby’s 
Significal Perspective1
Susan Petrilli
I myself have certainly profited most by and learnt most from 
thinkers with whom I do not naturally agree on the ordinary 
basis. Starting as it were higher up the stream of human 
experience I find I can translate my opponent; I see the why 
of him and in a dialect of thought different from his, find his 
mind too in mine. But then to me ‘nothing human is alien.’ 
Why should it be to any of us?…
 – From a letter by Welby to Bertrand Russell, 
12 February 1905
1. Translation as Method
Translation is not only a practice, but also a method of interpretation 
and understanding, of investigation and discovery, of verification 
and acquisition of new knowledge, and as such is also a method 
of critique. Moreover, translation theory can also be a theory that 
reflects on sign and meaning. Such an approach can contribute 
to a better understanding of the practice of translation. These 
1  The original nucleus of this essay is my paper ‘Sign, interpretation, and 
translation in Victoria Welby,’ delivered at the International Colloquium, 
Comunicazione, Interpretazione, Traduzione (University of Bari, Italy), 
published in the relative proceedings (Milan, Mimesis, 2006), and here 
developed and reworked.
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are constitutive aspects of the thought and research of Victoria 
Lady Welby (1837-1912), English significian and philosopher of 
language.2 
In her monograph What is Meaning (1903), Welby presents 
her theory of meaning, that she calls ‘significs,’ as a ‘philosophy 
of significance,’ ‘philosophy of translation’ and ‘philosophy of 
interpretation,’ with expressions that emphasize three distinct but 
interrelated dimensions of ‘significating’ processes (1983 [1903], 
p. 161). Welby broke new ground as she conducted the sense of 
‘translation’ into the territory of reflection on sign and meaning, 
proposing a theory of translation understood as a cognitive-
interpretive method involving all signifying processes. We know 
that she began focusing on the relation between signifying and 
interpreting practices in her early book of 1881, Links and Clues, 
where she identified four principles of interpretation addressed 
to: 1) the problem of literal meaning; 2) the risk of leveling sense; 
3) the importance of context; and 4) the problem of dialectics as 
a condition for unity. She also recognized the essential role of 
contradiction and complementarity among the different levels of 
sense in the configuration of a thought system (1881, pp. 31-36). 
Translation is described by Welby as ‘inter-translation,’ 
a method of interpretation and understanding and is related 
to reflection on signs and meaning (1983 [1903], p. 120). And 
given that translative processes are structural to sign processes 
as they develop across systemic and typological boundaries, the 
question of translation from a significal perspective is no less 
than structural to the theory of meaning. Consequently, Welby 
also identified a close interrelation between theory of translation 
and figurative language, underlining the importance of analogy in 
the very constitution of thought and communication processes. 
2  See biographical bibliographical note on Welby at the end of this essay, 
section 7. Victoria Welby’s footnotes to her own texts as they are here 
reported will be placed in brackets. In the body of this essay I have cited 
passages mainly from Welby’s monograph of 1903, What is Meaning?, 
to illustrate aspects of her translation theory as formulated in that book. 
At the end of this essay are appended her thus far unpublished papers 
on translation retrieved from the Welby Collection, York University 
Archives in Toronto, Canada.
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Mental activities are automatic translative processes, asserted 
Welby in accord with Peirce. And, in fact, Welby launched the 
idea of a new application of analogy which may be called in an 
extended sense translation. Developing Welby with Peirce we can 
state that all signs and expressions are translations in themselves 
before being subject to new translative/interpretive processes (see 
Petrilli and Ponzio, 2005, Part I, ch. 1 and 2).
Significs is a method for the enhancement of meaning 
and awareness, of significance through translative processes 
which are a condition for understanding and interpretation, 
for signifying behaviour generally (Petrilli, 2003b). Significs 
contributes to evidencing the relation between significance, 
interpretation, translation, therefore between translation and the 
ethical dimension of signifying processes in the human world as 
significance is enhanced. Without neglecting to take into account 
so-called ‘interlingual’ translation, with the term ‘translation’ 
Welby also included what may be designated a posteriori in Roman 
Jakobson’s terminology as the processes of ‘intersemiotic’ and 
‘intralingual’ translation ( Jakobson, 1959). Welby’s unpublished 
papers stored in the Welby Collection, York University Archives 
includes a file dedicated to the question of translation, ‘i.e., 
definition’ as recites the title of the file ‘Significs—Translation 
(i.e. Definition),’ now appended to the present article. Translation 
in Welby only corresponds in part to what Jakobson understands 
by ‘intralingual’ translation or ‘reformulation,’ as he also says. 
With reference to Jakobson’s schemem so-called ‘intralingual’ 
translation or ‘reformulation’ by no means exhausts Welby’s 
conception of translation, but only responds to an aspect of what 
we may describe as her very broad, significal and biosemiosic 
approach to translation theory and practice (see Welby, 1983 
[1903], pp. 121-129).
In a letter of 1908-1911 to her daughter Nina Cust, 
she wrote: ‘One side of my work (…) is to bring out the secret 
of a transfiguring translation. We speak lightly of analogy as 
casual, and no wonder; for few indeed of our images, metaphors, 
comparisons are as yet sound and true’ (in Cust, 1931, pp. 346-347). 
From a significal perspective translation involves comparison, 
association and analogy among different fields and dominions 
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of knowledge and experience, among different sign systems. 
Therefore beyond the ordinary sense of shift from one historical 
natural language to another, Welby theorized translation in terms 
of interpretation, that is, interpretation of one sign with another. 
Knowledge, meaning and experience are generated and develop 
thanks to interpretive-translative processes thus described in the 
encounter among signs from different sign systems, linguistic and 
nonlinguistic signs, among different historical natural languages, 
among special languages and linguistic registers within the same 
historical natural language, etc. Indeed, all sign systems, all 
languages are already in themselves interpretation-translation 
processes as we are describing them. 
Welby was commissioned to redact the entry ‘Translation’ 
for the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology in Three Volumes 
(edited by Baldwin, 1901-1905), in addition to the entries ‘Sensal’ 
(co-authored with George F. Stout) and ‘Significs’ (co-authored 
with Stout and James M. Baldwin). The entry ‘translation’ was 
published in 1902, and was formulated as follows: 
Translation: [Lat., trans + latum, part. of ferre, to bear, 
carry]: Ger. Uebersetzung; Fr. traduction (transposition); Ital. 
traduzione. 
1) In the literal sense, the rendering of one language into 
another.
2) The statement of one subject in terms of another; the 
transference of a given line of argument from one sphere to 
another; the use of one set of facts to describe another set, 
e.g. an essay in physics or physiology may be experimentally 
‘translated’ into aesthetics or ethics, a statement of biological 
into a statement of economic fact.
As Welby states in What is Meaning?, she used the term ‘translation’ 
because it was already in use, but in reality it only covers part 
of the sense suggested. Other terms beginning with the prefix 
‘trans’ which indicate further aspects of the process she was 
describing include the expressions ‘transference,’ ‘transformation,’ 
‘transmutation,’ ‘transfiguration,’ ‘making translucent and 
transparent’ and, above all, ‘transvaluation’ (see Welby, 1983 
[1903], p. 126 n2, p. 153).
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In a letter to Edmund Maclure written towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, Welby delineated a research project 
that developed ideas she had been carrying with her ‘all or nearly 
all’ her life, and which were generally in line with the findings of 
scientific progress of the time. Among the principles or notions 
forming her project, Translation was listed as point two with the 
following specification: ‘Translation. Every part of experience, 
while evolving a dialect of its own, ought to be capable of 
translation into the others, and of being tested by this means’ 
(Welby to Maclure, in Cust, 1929, 1889-1891, p. 265).
Welby formulated her conception of translation during 
the initial phases of her studies on language and expression. At 
the time she was specifically concerned with the need to update 
religious beliefs in terms of latest developments in the sciences, 
that is, to translate, update, verify and evaluate religious discourse 
in terms of scientific discourse. What we may call her interpretive-
translative method was elaborated in strict connection with what 
she also called the ‘analogical,’ and in some cases, the ‘homological’ 
method (see below). However, it is also important to underline 
that translation as understood by Welby did not privilege a 
given special language as the ‘target-language’ over others. This 
reductive approach was adopted subsequently by the Unity of 
Science Movement, logical empiricism or neo-positivism, and 
by the Vienna Circle connected to the latter, according to which 
all languages (unless a question of formal languages) were to be 
translated into the language of physics, as the very condition of the 
possibility of producing sense. Welby’s perspective was far broader 
and did not involve any form of reductionism. Welby’s point was 
that translation from one system to another was instrumental 
to the development of meaning in all its nuances, of knowledge, 
critical consciousness and ultimately of significance. To this end 
serious discourse can be translated into comical discourse and 
viceversa, verbal or nonverbal discourse can be transferred from 
one universe of discourse to another, for example, from the social 
sphere to the political, etc. (Chapter XVIII in What is Meaning? is 
rich in illustrations from the daily newspaper Westminster Gazette 
and from literary discourse in particular from Alice in Wonderland, 
with results that are at once critical and parodical). 
18 TTR XX 1
Susan Petrilli
In chapter XVII of What is Meaning? Welby presented 
an experimental translation in relation to the question of analogy 
of parts of a ‘Lecture on the Nervous System (1884),’ by Dr. 
Hughlings Jackson. This experiment consisted in transposing a 
lesson on the nervous system into the language of religion making 
the discourse of physiology resound in religious discourse and, 
viceversa, making religious discourse resound in the discourse 
of physiology, as a means of verifying the validity of both. As 
Welby reports in the opening to her chapter, despite any limits 
her translation met with the approval of many scholars of the 
time including ‘Sir J. Crichton-Browne, Dr. Mercier, and other 
alienists and medical authorities,’ but also Dr. Hughlings Jackson 
himself and Professor Croom Robertson who had challenged her 
‘to obtain for such an attempt the endorsement of the experts in 
any subject’ (see Welby, 1983 [1903], pp. 130-138).
With reference to the typology introduced by Roman 
Jakobson in his famous essay of 1959, ‘On Linguistic Aspects of 
Translation’ (see Petrilli, 2003, pp. 17-20), Welby was concerned 
with translation firstly as a cognitive method, ‘reformulation,’ 
‘definition,’ in a broad and plastic sense, and only consequently 
in the more obvious sense of shift from one language to another, 
‘interlingual translation.’ Without ignoring the specificity of 
communication among different historical-natural languages, she 
considered this particular translative practice as part of the larger 
framework, a methodological perspective for the acquisition of 
new knowledge. Therefore, more than on interlingual translation 
or translation properly understood (shift from one language to 
another, interpreting verbal signs of a given historical-natural 
language by means of the verbal signs of another historical-
natural language), to use Jakobson’s terminology Welby’s focus 
was on intralingual translation or rewording (interpreting verbal 
signs by means of other verbal signs from the same historical-
natural language) and intersemiotic translation or transmutation 
(interpreting verbal signs by means of nonverbal signs and 
viceversa, as well as nonverbal signs of a given sign system with 
nonverbal signs of another sign system). 
In the Table of Contents for a volume Welby was 
planning on writing, the name ‘Vailati, etc.’ was written in 
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parenthesis alongside ‘Translation,’ the title of Chapter One, Part 
Two (see Petrilli, 2006c, ch. I.2). Working in the same direction 
as Welby, the Italian mathematician and philosopher of language 
Giovanni Vailati (1863-1909) also theorized the cognitive-
translative method. In his various essays he elaborated a method 
of comparison and confrontation among different languages 
and discourse fields, comparing, for example, the language of 
morals with the language of geometry, verbal language with 
the language of algebra, etc. (see Vailati, 1898, 1905, 1908). To 
compare different languages—whether a question of verbal or 
nonverbal languages, and if a question of verbal languages, of 
different historical natural languages or different special languages 
within the same historical natural language—means to gaze at 
each language through the eyes of another language acting as 
interpretant of the former, that interprets and develops it. This is 
the interpretive-translative method which characterizes Welby’s 
own significal perspective and which she theorizes with Vailati in 
their correspondence (see letter by Welby to Vailati, 27 February 
1907; for their correspondence, see WCYA, Box 18). 
In What is Meaning?, Welby describes intellectual 
activity, progress in knowledge and experience in terms of the 
‘automatic process of translative thinking,’ in which through the 
use of metaphor and analogy ‘everything suggests or reminds 
us of something else’ (Welby, 1983 [1903], p. 34). ‘Translative 
thinking’ converges with signifying and semiosic processes at 
large in which something stands for something else, its meaning, 
which is generated through the translation of signs into other 
signs, into different types of signs and different sign systems. 
Continuous translative-interpretive processes enhance our 
capacity for significance as they sharpen perception of unforeseen 
connections, discovery of knowledge and truth previously 
unknown. Translation in all senses is possible on the basis of a 
common element among differences, in other words on the basis 
of the relation of similarity, whether analogical or homological, 
uniting things that are apparently unrelated thereby enhancing 
meaning value, as anticipated, in terms of significance. As she 
says in Chapter XIX in What is Meaning?:
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The idea of Translation in all its applications naturally implies 
the recognition of Distinction, and starts from the conception 
(or principle) of Equation, which is in the quantitative what 
Translation (the discovery and application of the common 
element in the diverse or different) is in the qualitative sphere. 
Much work, like that done by Mayer and Joule, remains to 
be attempted on a different plane. But it is obvious that only 
within narrow limits can we expect to find mechanical or even 
logically perfect equivalence. And even if we did we might 
suspect (in the world of mind) that the one was the derivative 
or reflection of the other; that we had found the analogue 
of the mirror. This, of course, cannot be excluded from the 
domain of translation in its extended (signific) sense; but we 
must carefully understand its conditions.3 
 But Translation may be helpful, that is, revelative and 
illuminative, when there is much less literal correspondence 
than in this case. It applies wherever there is a presumable 
unity implied in differences which can be distinguished.4 What 
3  [A good case of doubtful ‘translation’ seems to be afforded by Dr. 
Haacke, who ‘seeks to prove that the mechanical conception of nature 
leaves room for faith in a moral order of nature, by showing that natural 
bodies and organisms, and human ideals alike follow a great law of 
tendency to equilibrium.’ In his book (reviewed in Nature, April 2, 1896) 
‘Schopenhauer’s “will to live” is replaced by the “will to equilibrate,”’ 
and he shows that ‘art, morality, and religion exhibit the tendency to 
unite various elements into an equilibrium, that is, in simpler language, 
into an organic system.’ The reviewer, however, objects that ‘Dr. Haacke 
apparently takes natural selection to be a force instead of a mere process 
according to which forces act, dismisses it for this reason, and sets up in 
its place an unreal striving after equilibrium, which equilibrium is only 
an effect.’ 
 The kind of distinction which is nearest to actual identity may 
be illustrated by 12 + 8 = 15 + 5. Though these are both 20 there is a 
difference caused by logical perspective; we think the result in either way 
from either standpoint.] 
4  [‘He (Emerson) respects common-sense, and dreads to disturb his 
vague aspirations by translating them into a definite system. … (He) 
may even be translated into the phraseology of the humble “Lockist”’ 
(‘Emerson,’ Leslie Stephen, National Review, Feb. 1901, p. 890).
 The leaders of the Conservative party carry their sublime heads 
in clouds far above the common affairs of municipal life. They have never 
translated Imperialism into terms that fit these affairs, or thought out 
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we want is neither an artificial mode of uniting the apparently 
diverse, discrepant, separate, nor an equally artificial postulate 
of primary identity which either ignores, minimises, or excludes 
distinction.5
 As Translation involves both unity and distinction 
(the one actually and the other implicitly), language must itself 
be recognised as the means of discovering contrasts together 
with the links which constitute them elements of unity, or 
at least completely exclude the idea of final disparateness. 
Even the wildest analogy which betrays itself in popular or 
inherited (and animistic) metaphor is seen as a serious effort 
to accomplish this rational duty, one in which, as a fact, the 
whole race at all stages of its psychological ascent shares. For a 
thing is significant, both in the lower and in the higher sense, 
in proportion as it is expressible through bare sign or pictorial 
symbol or representative action. In the higher sense (that of vital 
or moral or rational importance) it is significant in proportion 
as it is capable of expressing itself in, or being translated into, 
more and more phases of thought or branches of science. The 
more varied and rich our employment of signs (so long as such 
employment be duly critical, securing that we know well what 
we are doing, also the indispensable condition of humour), the 
greater our power of inter-relating, inter-translating, various 
phases of thought, and thus of coming closer and closer to 
the nature of things in the sense of starting-points for the 
acquisition of fresh knowledge, new truth. (Welby, 1983 [1903], 
pp. 148-150)
In the quest for significance, the identification of unity and 
distinction, unity and difference, convergences and divergences, 
among different disciplines and discourses, therefore common 
elements and specificities, singularities, favours the reciprocal 
clarification of concepts and terminology, and more generally 
the acquisition of knowledge. Translating methods, concepts, and 
social and economic problems from any independent standpoint’ (Times, 
March 4, 1901).]
5  [An amusing instance of the double sense of translation occurs in 
the Westminster Gazette (Sept. 2, 1902), where the heading ‘Chinese 
“Character” Mistranslated’ may perhaps describe some diplomatic 
dealings with that enigmatic race, while it directly refers to a hitch in the 
verbal rendering of a treaty.]
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terminology from one disciplinary area to another according to 
a perspective that is metadisciplinary and transdisciplinary, that 
is, by relating different disciplines in a system that remains open 
and detotalized, leads to progress in research, to innovation and 
scientific discovery by enhancing the possibility of identifying 
new links and connections, new correspondences, and therefore of 
discovering new truths, new results. If carried out systematically 
and with critical consciousness (as also maintained Vailati 
who shared Welby’s views), even the simple reformulation of 
an expression in different linguistic registers and in different 
communicative contexts, the mere fact of reformulating a subject 
in terms of another, an utterance in terms of another from 
different fields of experience, theoretical and practical, contributes 
to this type of development as new meaning value emerges. By 
interconnecting with other signs in unending chains of semiosis 
according to the dialectics of the relation between similarity and 
difference, the sign is charged ever more with new and wider 
references and signifying nuances. In fact, we know that the more 
translation processes multiply, the more the cognitive capacity 
develops and the sign’s expressive power is enhanced in terms of 
significance. In interpretive-translative processes thus described 
the sign is developed, enriched, criticized, set at a distance, placed 
between inverted commas, parodied or simply imitated, and, in 
any case, interpreted by another sign, its interpretant. Indeed, the 
more a sign is complex, rich in signifying and axiological potential 
connecting it to a passed tradition and opening it to future 
translations, understood in the broad sense as interpretation, the 
dialogical relation between sign and interpretant (see Ponzio, 
2006b), the more it is difficult to establish the boundaries of a 
single sign or among different signs.
The interpretive-translative method is based on the 
identification of analogical relations between different signs and 
sign systems, whether verbal or nonverbal, and in addition to 
using analogies is also a method for discovering, creating, and 
testing them. Moreover, as says Welby, these are mainly of the 
proportional, structural and functional type. From this perspective 
the problem of translation is closely connected with the problem 
of iconicity in language, therefore of figurative language, and 
the role of metaphor, analogy and homology in the generation 
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of thought processes and communication. In fact analogy, 
comparison, association, figurative language at large, metaphors 
and similes are all considered by Welby as linguistic-cognitive 
devices realized through interpretive-translative processes for 
expressive empowerment in terms of significance. We know that 
she critiqued what she identified as bad linguistic usage, with 
particular reference to bad use of figurative language, which she 
considered as one of the main sources of prejudice, confusion and 
mystification.
Welby not only theorized the analogical method, but also 
the homological method, a term she borrowed from the biological 
sciences. The homological method consists in relating things that 
are distant from each other, that is, in tracing a common core 
uniting things that appear different and completely unrelated. 
Following scientific research in the fields of biology, psychology, 
and language studies, Welby identified a homological relation 
between organic life and consciousness, between organic life 
systems and language or verbal sign systems. ‘“Now, however, 
it may be said that we have to leave the field of analogy and 
enter that of homology”,’ specifying in a note citing Dr. J. Ward 
(Art. ‘Psychology,’ Ency. Brit., 10th edit.), ‘“Between organic 
development and mental development there is (…) more than 
an analogy”’ (1983 [1903], p. 21, and n. 1).6 Beyond surface 
resemblances and associations, the homological method searches 
for profound genetical, structural, functional and dynamical 
relationships among the terms of reference in question. Indeed, 
Welby warned against the tendency to exchange analogy or 
surface relation of similarity with homology or genetico-structural 
similarity. As she specified once again in Chapter XVI of What 
Is Meaning? returning to the problem of the relation between 
analogy, homology and translation understood as interpretive-
cognitive method, what she calls ‘inter-translation’: ‘(…) there 
is a method both of discovering, testing, and using analogy (or 
in some cases homology), the value of which does not yet seem 
to be recognised; and this may be called in an extended sense 
Translation’ (1983 [1903], p. 126).
6  Ferruccio Rossi-Landi identified a homological relation between the 
utterance and the artifact, between linguistic and nonlinguistic work (see 
Rossi-Landi, 1985, pp. 47-49).
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Welby’s own language is rich in figures of speech, in the 
use of simile and metaphors, in relations of analogy and homology 
with different spheres of experience, through which she clarified 
and developed her ideas, often advancing new hypotheses. 
Among the numerous examples of this type of translation which 
abound in her writings, the following passage from her book of 
1911, Significs and Language, explores the concept of beauty and 
signifying value in verbal language on the basis of the relation 
of analogy with musical language (anticipating developments in 
contemporary experimental music): 
Language might in one aspect be called articulate music. And we 
may be grateful to the so-called stylists, although in their efforts 
after beauty they sometimes sacrifice instead of transfiguring 
significance, and always tend to defeat themselves by making 
significance secondary. For at least their work recognizes some 
analogy between the ordered harmony of music which we call 
attunement, and the true ideal of language.
 And thus we are reminded that as yet language in 
ordinary use barely rises above the level of noise, and only 
suggests the perfect natural harmony which ought to be its 
essential character. The reason for this, however, is not merely 
that in language we have failed to develop a full control of 
our ‘singing’ power, or that we are still content with the rude 
instruments of ancient days, although this is to a great extent 
true. We may put it in another way and, as already suggested, 
may say that in civilised speech we have acquired linguistic 
instruments of real complexity and implicit power to render 
subtle forms of harmony, but that it has never occurred to us 
to tune them together, to attune them. And we may suppose 
ourselves to have told one who suggested the need of this that 
the proposal was pedantic, and that to tune an instrument 
was to restrict its scope, as the ambiguity of tone and conflict 
of intention which reduces music to noise means a valuable 
freedom secured. We are liberating music by ostracizing the 
tuner enriching the language with grunt, squall, yell, squeal, 
and excruciating discord! (Welby, 1985 [1911], pp. 72-73) 
2. Significance in Interpretive-Translative Processes
The more interpretive-translative processes multiply through the 
open network of signs, the more the signifying universe expands, 
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and with this our understanding of life. Significance increases 
as interpretive-translative processes increase through the sign 
network reaching ever higher degrees in signifying (or semiotic) 
resonance the higher the degree of otherness. On this account 
interpretation-translation is not only a question of identification 
but also of what with Mikhail Bakhtin we identify as ‘answering 
comprehension’ or ‘responsive understanding,’ which is inseparable 
from listening and opening to the other. The sign’s meaning is 
engendered in the interpretive-translative procedures of signifying 
and communicative processes. Thanks to the continuous work of 
translation, the sign develops its meaning in another sign that 
transcends and enriches it. Therefore, the more the sign translates 
into different spheres of thought, branches of science, and fields 
of practical experience, always ready to transcend its own limits, 
the more it is ‘plastic,’ the higher the degree in cognitive power, 
signifying potential, and significance (see Petrilli and Ponzio, 
2005).
The problem of translation read in the light of Welby’s 
philosophy of interpretation and significance, underlines the 
reality of ‘language’ (understood as a modeling device, or in Welby’s 
terminology, ‘mother sense’ or ‘primal sense’) and ‘languages’ 
(verbal and nonverbal) as dynamic and dialogic phenomena, 
capable of gazing at the universe dialogically and reciprocally 
interpreting it through the eyes of the other. Thanks to the 
ability of keeping account of and expressing a plurality of 
different viewpoints, language and languages are capable of 
creativity and critique: ‘plasticity,’ ‘ductility,’ ‘flexibility,’ or 
‘ambiguity’ (understood in a positive sense) indicate qualities that 
characterize the semantic-linguistic sphere as theorized by Welby. 
In fact, such qualities are essential to maintaining interpretive 
and communicative adequacy of language and languages, their 
capacity for the acquisition of new knowledge, adaptation to new 
linguistic needs, to different communicative contexts, for critical 
consciousness. Interpersonal communication, communicative 
interaction, is possible thanks to the ‘plasticity’ of signs, to say 
it with Welby, thanks to their ‘dialogism’ and polylogism, to say 
it with Bakhtin (1981, 1986, 1990). Successful communication 
involves dialogic understanding which is grounded in the logic 
of otherness in the relation among interpretants. But even more 
26 TTR XX 1
Susan Petrilli
radically, from the perspective of significs, or what we may call 
‘biosignifics,’ keeping account of the intimate interconnection 
theorized by Welby between significs and biology, such 
characteristics as ‘plasticity,’ ‘ductility,’ ‘flexibility’ are the 
condition for continuity and development of life itself over the 
planet, from which language and languages arise. This approach 
is very much in line with latest developments in the sign 
sciences as represented by biosemiotics and biophilosophy, and 
as developed today, for example, in terms of Thomas A. Sebeok’s 
global semiotics (see Sebeok, 2001).
The significal approach to sign and meaning has important 
implications for our system of beliefs, for our certainties, in the 
last analysis, as anticipated, for the problem of truth. On Welby’s 
account, truth is dialogical, that is, it can only be identified on the 
basis of what with Bakhtin we recognize as the dialogic relation 
of otherness, and as such is always open to interrogation. The 
capacity for approaching truth grows with the capacity for taking 
into account multiple viewpoints, voices and signs (see Petrilli, 
1995, pp. 35-61). All this goes in the direction of reinforcing the 
interrelation between interpretation, translation and significance. 
In the words of Welby from Chapter XVI in What is Meaning?:
All systems also inevitably concentrate in Significance as 
their essential value as well as test. And thus Significs alone 
gives us the power of inter-translation. As Giordano Bruno 
truly says, ‘Certitude is only acquired by a kind of comparison, 
by conferring (in its true sense) one sensible object or one 
sense with another.’ This is true in a richer sense even than he 
intended. What you say is true (1) in one sense; (2) in many 
senses; (3) in all but one sense, (4) in all senses; (5) in no sense 
(i.e. is nonsense or is false). ‘For the same Truth may be in 
different subjects (…) and given us through diverse senses,’ in 
both senses of that term. (1983 [1903], p. 120)
‘Significance’ according to Welby’s terminology indicates 
the maximum expression value of a sign. As says Welby, ‘all 
systems concentrate in Significance in their essential value 
as well as test. And thus Significs alone gives us the means of 
inter-translation’ (1983 [1903], p. xxi). From the perspective 
of significs, the sign not only emerges as a cognitive entity, but 
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also as an axiological entity, as an expression of the relation of 
signs to values. The more a sign is subject to ‘transference,’ 
‘transformation,’ ‘transmutation,’ ‘transfiguration’ and above all 
‘transvaluation’ (which, as anticipated, evidence different aspects 
of translative processes), the more the sign translates consciously 
and dialectically, or better, dialogically, into other signs from 
different spheres of thought, knowledge, and practical experience, 
the more it translates into different languages, cultures and value 
systems, the more its significance, import and ultimate value 
increases. To be significant means to have value and concerns the 
ethical dimension of signifying processes.
Therefore what we must also underline is that translative-
interpretive processes thus understood favour the development 
of semantic-axiological and metalinguistic consciousness, that is, 
of critical and what we may call ‘semioethical’ consciousness (see 
Petrilli and Ponzio, 2005; Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio, 2005). From the 
significal perspective, the word ‘transvaluation’ best conveys the 
idea of interconnectedness between translation, meaning, and 
cognitive-ethical processes, between translative processes and 
Welby’s meaning triad ‘sense,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘significance’ (these 
terms indicate a progressive advancement from the lowest to 
the highest grades in expression value in concrete situations of 
communicative interaction). As Welby says in What is Meaning?: 
‘There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Sense of a 
word, but only the sense in which it is used—the circumstances, 
state of mind, reference, ‘universe of discourse’ belonging to 
it. The Meaning of a word is the intent which it is desired to 
convey—the intention of the user. The Significance is always 
manifold, and intensifies its sense as well as its meaning, by 
expressing its importance, its appeal to us, its moment for us, its 
emotional force, its ideal value, its moral aspects, its universal or 
at least social range’ (Welby, 1983 [1903], pp. 5-6). And, in fact, 
the attribution of sense to the object, of meaning to the sign, of 
significance to signifying processes in their globality is no less 
than the result of translation understood in terms of interpretive, 
cognitive and axiological procedure.
As a philosophy of significance, interpretation and 
translation, significs is also described by Welby as a ‘method 
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of synthesis’ valid both for science and philosophy, ‘a method 
of observation,’ as she says in What is Meaning?, ‘a mode of 
experiment,’ which includes ‘the inductive and deductive methods’ 
in one process, that is, what Vailati calls the hypothetical-deductive 
method and Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) the ‘abductive’ or 
‘retroductive’ method, which enable us to reach the highest levels 
of meaning:
Significs, then, will bring us the philosophy of Significance; i.e. 
a raising of our own whole conception of meaning to higher 
and more efficient level; a bringing cosmos out of the present 
‘chaos’ of our ideas as to sense, meaning, and significance, and 
showing us that we need to use these terms in a certain order 
of value and range. Its best type of metaphor is the ‘solar,’ its 
best mine of analogy is the biological; because, as implying 
an extension of purview given us in spatial form by (post-
Copernican) astronomy, it tends to relate the idea of life to 
the ideas of motion and matter, and moreover to relate the 
idea of mind to both. Thus Significs involves essentially and 
typically the philosophy of Interpretation, of Translation, and 
thereby of a mode of synthesis accepted and worked with by 
science and philosophy alike; profoundly modifying what we 
wrongly call the ‘root’ ideas of religion, of ethics, of poetry, 
of art, and, lastly, of practical life in all forms. But if studied 
systematically it would be seen from the first to provide a 
method of observation, a mode of experiment which extends 
far beyond the laboratory, and includes the inductive and 
deductive methods in one process. There would never be any 
need to struggle that this view of things may supersede others; 
it could never be a supplanting system, and could never thus be 
attached to any individual name; it must necessarily be worked 
out by many co-operating minds. The principle involved forms 
a natural self-acting Critique of every system in turn, including 
the common-sense ideal. But also it gives the gist, the vital 
centre the growth-point of every existent organism of thought. 
It explains its own thinker to himself; it accounts for his thinking 
what he does as he does, and thus explains other thinkers to 
themselves. In fact, for the first time we gain a glimpse into 
what lies ‘beyond the veil,’ which both our own primitive and 
confused idea of Meaning and our modes of applying it have 
drawn over the world. The criteria thus reached will vindicate 
themselves alike to the most opposed of our thinkers. (Welby, 
1983 [1903], pp. 161-162)
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But to return to the relation between meaning (understood 
in the broad sense of the triad sense, meaning and significance) 
and the use of language, Welby’s considerations also shed light 
on the relation between language (therefore text and utterance), 
the speaking subject, and significance. In the last analysis, her 
significal approach to meaning sheds light on the problem of 
communication and understanding, that is, critical and creative 
understanding, what with Bakhtin we have identified as responsive 
understanding, and with Peirce I would venture to call agapastic 
understanding.
If in oral or written communication we understand what 
is said, this is because comprehension is always achieved through 
interpretants that are not uniquely verbal. What we say is based 
on preceding verbal and nonverbal communication and is said 
as part of an extended network of signs in which any historical-
natural language only occupies a very limited space. When we 
speak to communicate, this ‘event’ is possible on the basis of 
communication conditions established previously. We could 
make what would seem to be a paradoxical claim—but paradoxes 
serve to evidence how things stand—that when we speak to 
communicate communication has already occurred. This is true in 
the case of the production of both oral and written texts. Whether 
written or oral, speech does not install communication relations, 
but, if anything, ratifies, maintains, notifies, declares, or exhibits 
them, furnishing ‘portmanteau words’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1999) which enable partners to mutually recognize each other, 
to stay in these relations, and to express the will to maintain and 
preserve them.
That which occurs is more or less the same as that 
which occurs in a love declaration: unless it is reduced to a 
purely conventional or formal act (in which case it is no longer 
a love relationship), a declaration of love is formulated when the 
love relationship already exists, so that the declaration is only a 
portmanteau word and anticipates a complementary portmanteau 
word as its reply. When a professor delivers a lecture in a university 
hall, for it to be successful a communication relation must already 
subsist; this professor may make the most original and exciting 
statements ever, but the first implicit statement recites ‘this is a 
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lecture, accept it as such.’ When a child begins communicating 
with its mother through words, communication with her already 
exists and is intense, this too being the necessary condition for 
learning how to speak.
If the utterance text were to constitute its very own 
conditions, if it were self-sufficient, independent from context, 
if it were not to depend on anything else but itself, this would 
mean that it is based uniquely on initiative taken by the speaking 
subject and on the linguistic system that subject employs. On 
the contrary, the word similarly to the subject does not have a 
priority in the construction of communication relations. Each 
time there is a subject, the word, therefore a text, communication 
has already occurred, and that which the subject says is relative to 
that communication.
To speak, to be a speaking subject, to act as a writer, is 
always to respond, and in fact all texts are responses, including 
the subject understood as a text. The subject and the text may 
constitute and decide anything, but not the conditions that make 
them possible. This already emerges from the fact that every time 
the subject speaks, every time it produces a text, it is responding. 
Furthermore, the text cannot constitute or decide anything about 
its reception, about its being heard or read. That to speak is to 
respond and that speaking can do nothing without presupposing 
that someone is listening, says clearly that initiative does not 
belong to the subject, to the I, but to the other: an other with 
whom the subject is already communicating, to whom it must 
respond and answer to/for. The terms of such response are not 
only verbal but, on the contrary, take place on the basis of relations 
and sign systems that cannot be reduced to linguistic-verbal signs 
alone. And, in any case, the other must grant listening as a primary 
condition with respect to communication as installed by the text.
Verbal action does not presuppose another verbal action. 
As stated, the word is a response, but that to which it responds—not 
at the superficial level of rejoinders in a formal dialogue—is 
not in turn a word, a text, but rather a communicative situation 
which was not produced by speech. The actions accomplished by 
words and texts at the level of communicative exchange, of the 
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‘linguistic market,’ presuppose social relations, communication 
relations which are not necessarily in turn relations among words 
and texts. In other words, the production relations of relations 
among words are not in turn relations among words. 
An immediate consequence of what we have said so 
far is that verbal action is not only grounded in nonverbal 
communicative conditions, but presupposes them. We can even 
state that it is improper to speak of ‘speech acts.’ In fact, on our 
part we prefer the expression ‘verbal action.’ A distinction may be 
established between the terms ‘act’ and ‘action’: the latter concerns 
the subject, is connected with consciousness, is intentional, is 
programmed, already decided, and presupposes initiative taken by 
the subject; on the contrary, the act is what has already occurred 
before action thus understood. The subject is involved in the act, 
implied by it, has already been acted, decided, and is subject as in 
subject to. When the speaking subject does something with words, 
when it produces texts, when it fulfils verbal actions, the act has 
already occurred: the communicative action of words presupposes 
a communicative act that cannot be reduced to verbal actions as 
its necessary condition.
But the point we wish to underline in the present context 
is that if communicative action can decide its own meaning, it 
does not decide its own significance. Performative action can do 
things because it is action interpreted as being significant.
We have stated that to be significant means to have value. 
And value cannot be conferred by the same subject that signifies 
with its action. If in addition to having meaning the performative 
action of condemning becomes an event that changes things, this 
is because it is significant as well, it has value, weight, import. All 
this presupposes a preceding communicative act which confers 
such value. Performative verbal action is action which must be 
interpreted to have meaning; but in order to be performative 
action as well, that is, capable of having an effect, of modifying 
something else, such action must have already received an 
interpretation which is antecedent to the relation it constitutes at 
the moment of occurrence. Antecedence concerns interpretation 
which has already invested performative action with significance.
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We know that the term ‘significance’ is used by Welby in 
triadic correlation with the other two terms, ‘sense’ and ‘meaning.’ 
Using this terminology, we could state that the ‘meaning’ of action 
presupposes ‘sense’ understood as a derivative of ‘to sense’ and 
not only as ‘orientation,’ ‘direction.’ In order to be performative, 
verbal action must be ‘sensed,’ ‘felt,’ if perhaps not by whomever 
accomplishes it, certainly by partners addressed by the speaker 
in a given communicative context. Differently from significance, 
‘sense’ is associated with the senses, with feelings, with sentiments 
or passions. Instead, ‘significance’ refers to given values fixed and 
flourishing in a community, which may be more or less extended 
and comprehensive ranging, for example, from a minimal social 
community constituted by a couple to a city, nation, continent, 
etc. Therefore, in addition to sense as connected to listening, 
verbal action presupposes implied meanings, significance.
3. Welby’s Translation Theory and the Conception of Language 
in Peirce, Bakhtin, and Wittengstein 
‘When you speak in one of them [essaylets] of Man as translating 
vegetal and Brute strength into intellectual and spiritual vigor, 
that word translating seems to me to contain profound truth 
wrapped up in it.’ This is what Peirce says in a letter to Welby 
dated 14 March 1909 (in Hardwick, 1977, pp. 111). In fact, 
Welby’s considerations, similarly to Vailati’s, recall Peirce’s 
interpretive-cognitive model according to which the meaning 
of a sign is developed by another sign, the interpretant, through 
interpretive-translative processes. The idea of amplification and 
enhancement of meaning through signs that defer to each other 
as conveyed by Welby is captured by one of her interpreters, L.P. 
Jacks, in his introduction to her 1931 book of correspondence, 
Other Dimensions: ‘Like the universe, whose offspring it is, 
thought rests—so we learn—on no “foundations,” but revolves in 
an endlessly “ascending spiral” to higher forms of itself, retaining 
its conquests and perpetually enlarging them’ (in Cust, 1931, 
p. 11). Welby’s interpretive-translative approach evidences the 
spirit of investigation that pushes mankind to question the nature 
of meaning and to probe the meaning of the universe itself, an 
attitude she fully captured with the question ‘What does it mean?,’ 
or ‘What does it signify?.’ In that question lies the generating 
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source of intellectual activity, the driving power of all that may be 
summed up under the name of philosophy. And again, as says the 
same Jacks interpreting Welby’s thought system: ‘The universe 
may be compared to a spoken sentence imperfectly heard, while 
philosophy is the attempt to articulate it more clearly, thereby 
revealing what it means’ (in Cust, 1931, p. 12).
Peirce theorized a situation of ‘infinite semiosis’ proposing 
a sign model based on the relation of dialogic deferral among 
signs, in the light of which meaning is conceived, in its primary 
acceptation, as ‘the translation of a sign into another system of 
signs, and which, in the acceptation here applicable, is a second 
assertion from which all that follows from the first assertion 
equally follows, and vice versa’ (Peirce, 1931-1958, 4.127). 
According to the theory of infinite semiosis, the meaning of a sign 
is the interpretant sign in an open ended chain of renvois from 
one interpretant to the next. And just as for Welby everything 
suggests or reminds us of something else, in Peirce meaning is 
given in the transformation of one sign into another ‘equivalent’ 
or possibly ‘more developed’ sign (interpretant), with which we 
know something more. The interpretant sign further enhances 
the overall signifying potential of the preceding sign together 
with the interpreter’s overall understanding of the previous sign. 
In other words, a sign subsists thanks to another sign acting as 
its interpretant, so that its meaning is its translation into another 
sign. The sign flourishes in relations of reciprocal translation and 
substitution among signs with respect to which the original sign 
is never given autonomously and antecedently. As Peirce himself 
had already explained in a letter to Welby of 12 October 1904:
A sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object. 
Taking sign in its broadest sense, its interpretant is not 
necessarily a sign. (…) But we may take a sign in so broad 
a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an 
action or experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning 
of sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling. (…) It 
appears to me that the essential function of a sign is to render 
inefficient relations efficient—not to set them into action, but 
to establish a habit or general rule whereby they will act on 
occasion. According to the physical doctrine, nothing ever 
happens but the continued rectilinean velocities with the 
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accelerations that accompany different relative positions of the 
particles. All other relations, of which we know so many, are 
inefficient. Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and 
a sign is something by knowing which we know something 
more. With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, 
of the contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence 
of which knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought & 
knowledge is by signs. A sign therefore is an object which is 
in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant 
on the other in such a way as to bring the interpretant into 
a relation to the object corresponding to its own relation to 
the object. I might say ‘similar to its own’ for a correspondence 
consists in a similarity; but perhaps correspondence is narrower. 
(Hardwick, 1977, pp. 31-32)
Developing Welby’s position on translation in a Peircean 
key also involves the possibility of rereading the Peircean concepts 
of ‘translation’ and ‘infinite semiosis’ from the perspective of 
significs. This too is an exercise in translation. These concepts 
emerge in Peirce as the necessary condition for interrelation 
between sign theory and theory of knowledge; but it must also 
be borne in mind that significs supersedes all strictly cognitive 
boundaries in a dimension where the cognitive and the ethical 
at last come together. According to this approach, the concept of 
knowledge is not only developed in cognitive terms, but also in 
what with Welby we may call moralising and humanising terms. 
As says Welby in Significs and Language:
There are probably many who dimly realize, and would 
provisionally admit, that our present enormous and ever-
growing developments of mechanical power and command 
are there to be interpreted in terms of psychology. This must 
presumably affect not only the very minds which are conceiving 
and applying them to such tremendous and apparently 
illimitable purpose, but also the thinkers concerned with the 
mental sphere itself, its content and its range.
 We may thus suspect, if not actually infer, that human 
thought also is on the threshold of corresponding developments 
of power—developments to which the ‘new birth’ of scientific 
method in the nineteenth century was but the prelude and 
preparation. If, indeed, we deny this conclusion, or dispute this 
assumption, we may effectually hold such a development in 
arrest—or risk forcing it out in unhealthy forms—just as, three 
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hundred years ago, the spirit of scientific discovery was fettered 
and retarded on the verge of its great career of achievement. 
The explanation is in part, if only in part, the same now as it 
was then. For in the pre-Baconian age the study of phenomena, 
the inquiry into ‘the causes of things,’ was not more inhibited 
by theological prepossessions and denunciations than by 
the dominance of an intellectual nomenclature which ruled 
reality out of the universe and confidently took its place in all 
disquisition or discussion upon Man and Nature. The forward 
step taken was largely the result of a breaking of the barriers 
created by traditional terminology, a pushing aside of fictitious 
formulas, and a coming directly into the presence of things in 
order to learn whatever they had to say ‘for themselves’—and 
for the Whole. All the conditions—especially the supreme 
condition, an urgent need—are now existent for a second and 
similar forward step, but upon another plane and to higher 
purposes. For the fresh advance which now seems imminent, 
as it is sorely needed, should be no mere continuation of the 
Baconian search, the accumulation of data for a series of 
inferences regarding the properties of the material system as 
usually understood, but rather the interpretation, the translation 
at last into valid terms of life and thought, of the knowledge 
already so abundantly gained. While man fails to make this 
translation—to moralise and humanize his knowledge of 
the cosmos, and so to unify and relate it to himself—his 
thinking is in arrears, and mentally he lags behind his enacted 
experience. That we in this age do lag behind, and that we have 
thus far failed to achieve a great ad general act of translation, 
is a loss chiefly due to our unanimous neglect to understand 
Expression, its nature, conditions, range of form and function, 
unrealized potencies and full value or worth. And therefore the 
first message of what is now to be named Significs7 is that we 
must amend this really inhuman fault; that we must now study 
Expression precisely as we have long been studying ‘nature’ and 
‘Mind’ in the varying ranges of both these terms. (Welby, 1985 
[1911], pp. 1-3)
Growth in knowledge which is paralleled by growth in 
significance, involves the accumulation of knowledge not only in 
quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms. As anticipated, 
7  [For a definition of this term see the Oxford Dictionary, the American 
Dictionary of Philosophy, and the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edit.]
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this favours the development of conscious awareness in human 
beings. And with Welby we must also underline that such 
development favours the human sense of total responsibility 
towards life and semiosis pervading the entire universe. 
This conception of translation recalls Bakhtin’s research, 
as much as he did not directly theorize the problem of translation. 
For Bakhtin as well, semiosis or sign activity is an open process 
of deferral and transferral of signs into other signs, a ‘dialogic 
relation’ among signs. As such semiosis cannot take place outside 
interpretation / translation processes. Both Welby and Bakhtin 
believe that the speaker develops consciousness and expressive 
capacity through continuous ‘translation’ processes from one 
sign to another, necessary to the development of linguistic 
and nonlinguistic consciousness, of experience and knowledge 
generally. In the conception of both researchers, such processes 
are ever more innovative and creative the higher the degree of 
dialogism and otherness in the relation between the translated 
sign, or the ‘interpreted’ sign, and the sign that translates it, the 
‘interpretant,’ the ‘translatant.’ Similarly to Welby, Bakhtin too 
underlines the importance of gazing at one sign system with the 
eyes of another sign system (referring also to the relation between 
verbal and nonverbal signs, as in the case of the transposition of 
the nonverbal signs of carnival into the verbal signs of carnivalized 
literature), of gazing at a given language with the eyes of another, 
of considering a literary genre, or more generally a discourse 
genre, with reference to another, and so forth.
With respect to the problem of figurative language, a 
leitmotif throughout all her research itinerary, Welby motivated 
her interest by underlining that ‘while language itself is a symbolic 
system its method is mainly pictorial’ (Welby, 1983 [1903], p. 38). 
And again she claims that ‘[…] a thing is significant, both in the 
lower and in the higher sense in proportion as it is expressible 
through bare sign or pictorial symbol or representative action’ 
(Welby, 1983 [1903], p. 150). By referring to one of the most 
important triads introduced by Peirce in his classification of 
signs, the tripartition of signness into symbolicity, indexicality 
and iconicity (see Peirce, 1931-1958: 2.247-2.249; and Peirce’s 
letter to Welby of 12 October 1904, in Hardwick, 1977), we may 
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translate or reformulate Welby’s statement as follows: if verbal 
language is a conventional system, its method is above all iconic. In 
other words, Welby, like Peirce, fully recognizes the fundamental 
role carried out by iconicity in the development of both verbal 
and nonverbal semiosis, in particular the importance of the iconic 
relation of hypothetical similarity in verbal language. 
Moreover, Welby’s position on this specific problematic 
may be related to the research of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-
1951) as formulated in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We 
do not know whether there was any form of direct contact 
between Welby and Wittgenstein, but most certainly there were 
indirect connections, given that they had common acquaintances 
including the philosophers Bertrand Russell, Philippe Jourdain, 
Samuel Alexander, and that they moved in the same cultural 
circles connected above all to Cambridge University (see Nolan, 
1990, pp. 96-98). In addition to conceptualizing language in terms 
of activity and function, to recognizing the determining role of 
context in the communicative situation, and conceiving theory of 
meaning also in terms of cognitive therapy, both scholars identify 
in analogy and the relation of similarity a determining aspect 
for communication and the constitution of linguistic signifying 
processes generally. Wittgenstein distinguished between ‘names’ 
and ‘propositions’ analysing the relation between ‘names’ or ‘simple 
signs’ used in the proposition, where the object or meaning is of 
the conventional order (see Wittgenstein, 1922, pp. 202). Welby 
too spoke of simple signs, of ‘bare signs.’ In Wittgenstein’s view, 
the rule or code that relates the sign to the object to which it 
refers is conventional, that is, arbitrary, and therefore cannot be 
discovered simply by guessing (we know that sign arbitrariness 
is a category proposed by Ferdinand Saussure [1857-1913] in 
Cours de linguistique générale, 1916, to characterize the relation 
between signifiant and signifié in individual words, or in individual 
nonverbal signs forming ‘conventional,’ social codes). Instead, the 
relation of whole propositions or ‘propositional signs’ (Welby’s 
‘pictorial symbol’ and ‘representative action’) and that which 
they signify (their interpretants) is a relation of similarity, says 
Wittgenstein, that is, a relation of the iconic type. Analogously 
to Wittgensteins’ ‘proposition,’ Welby’s ‘pictorial symbol’ and 
‘representative action’ are complete high level signifying units.
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Similarly to Wittgenstein’s analysis in the Tractatus, 
Welby’s language analysis is not limited to describing phenomena 
of signification, language and thought, but rather aims to account 
for their generation. (In addition to convergences there are also 
important divergencies between their theories as clearly emerges 
with Tractatus. In this volume, for example, Wittgenstein elaborates 
an isomorphic conception of the relation between language and 
reality which Welby criticized and which Wittgenstein himself 
revised in the subsequent phases of his research as represented by 
Philosophical Investigations). 
The work of scholars like Welby and others so far 
mentioned contribute to illustrating the more complex levels 
of signifying, expressive and communicative processes, without 
reducing them to the mere status of information transmission 
and message exchange. Each of these authors calls our attention 
to the importance for signifying processes of iconism, otherness, 
and relations among signs beyond all systemic restrictions. This 
orientation also helps evidence the dialectical-dialogic nature 
of interpretive-translative processes in the relation between the 
categories of ‘unity’ and ‘difference,’ as Welby says, between the 
‘centripetal forces’ and ‘centrifugal forces’ operating in language, 
as Bakhtin says (1981, 1986) and, therefore, between the power 
of centralization and decentralization, between monologism and 
polylogism, monolingualism and plurilingualism, respectively 
oriented by the logic of identity or the logic of alterity. Thanks to 
such dialectics, knowledge and truth are never given once and for 
all, but, on the contrary, are open to investigation and subject to 
modification in the continuous work of adapting to new contexts 
and communicative practices, beginning from everyday life.
Developing Welby’s intuitions in the light of recent 
studies in language theory and the sign sciences generally, we 
can state that semiosis, that is, the situation in which something 
functions as a sign, is not possible without translation, indeed 
semiosis itself is a translative-interpretive process. The role of 
translation is fundamental in the constitution itself of sign, both 
verbal and nonverbal, in the determination itself of meaning. 
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The interconnection between signs and translation emerges 
when we posit the category of replaceability, that is, the possibility 
of being said otherwise (whether verbally or nonverbally), as 
a necessary condition for signhood, that is, when the sign is 
considered not only as something that replaces something else, 
but that may also in turn be replaced by something else. In 
other words, processes of replacement and transposition do not 
involve exclusion of sense, but rather shift in sense and therefore 
reciprocal signifying enhancement among signs. Consequently, 
meaning may be defined as a class of verbal and nonverbal sign 
materials which ‘say’ of each other, that is, which reciprocally 
defer to each other. Each term is either an interpretant sign or 
an interpreted sign of the other, depending on signifying context, 
in semiosic processes in which the interpretant sign replaces the 
interpreted sign which it somehow develops. Identity of the sign 
requires continuous processes of shift and deferral: to be this sign 
here, a sign must always be interpreted and become other thanks 
to the interpretant sign that interprets it. 
4. Translatability and Common Meaning
The following passage from Chapter XVIII in What is Meaning? 
theorizes interlingual translation as part of the larger context 
where translation is understood in a broad sense as converging 
with life processes, beyond the boundaries of historical-natural 
languages. It also points out the importance of the concept of the 
‘common character’ uniting different languages, the ‘community 
of nature’ in Welby’s language theory, a signifying area she 
also indicated with the expressions ‘common sense,’ ‘common 
meaning,’ ‘common language.’ These concepts are interesting to 
read in light of research by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1921-1985) on 
signs and language, in particular his concepts of ‘common speech,’ 
‘linguistic work,’ and in a more mature phase of his theory, ‘social 
reproduction’ (see Rossi-Landi, 1961, 1968, 1985, 1992a). Says 
Welby in What is Meaning?: 
Translation considered as mental digestion renders foreign 
substances innocuous if not actually nourishing. Digestion (next 
to vibration turned into sense-product) is the ruling example 
of translative change. Even waste product manures the glorious 
rose, the corn, the vine, etc., and water, through the agency of 
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‘life,’ becomes sap, grape-juice, wine. For in the larger sense 
wherein it is here used, translation includes transformation.8
 But we think that to digest what we have read, marked, 
and learnt does not mean that we ought to expect results 
from acting thus, analogous to the results of actual digestion. 
The consequence is that this metaphor actually hinders us in 
expressing what we mean. We look for what, judged by our 
own figure, we cannot have. Digested food is profoundly 
changed by the process. If I say, ‘I will carefully weigh your 
statement after sifting the evidence you have brought,’ I give 
you quite a different impression from what you would have 
received if I had said, ‘I will carefully sow, cultivate, and then 
eat and assimilate your statement, and let you know the result.’ 
The latter alone refers to digestion: sifting and weighing belong 
to quite another order of ideas. At present a really illustrative 
use of metaphor would often read like burlesque. But this is a 
great loss.
8  [It is worth remembering that not only can you translate the serious 
into the humorous and vice versa (though the later is too seldom done) 
but you can translate from one sphere of humour into another. E.g. Alice 
in Wonderland translated by the Westminster Gazette, pictures and all; a 
perfect example of translation from the social into the political sphere. 
 Again Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions has stimulated and 
indeed started a good deal of research into the origin of emotional signs; 
but we do not enough notice the importance of the translation of these 
which is always going on. The history of the licking of a dog, of a kiss, of 
an arm round the neck or ‘waist,’ of stroking, even of a loving smile gains 
a new ethical significance when we realise that these and other signs of 
attachment and even tender or passionate affection have been translated 
from savage violence and the natural expressions of hatred or contempt; 
while the trembling, faintness, and tears of sudden joy or thankful relief 
were originally signs of suffering or terror. The lesson here seems to be 
that we are utterly wrong in trying merely to eradicate evil tendencies in 
children or savages; what we have to aim at is always the translation of 
these into the corresponding good. But until the wide application of the 
term, especially in training, is realised, we cannot hope to effect this.
 In one case, however, it has been successfully done for practical 
purposes. The sheep-dog’s enthusiasm in guiding and guarding the flock 
which he has been trained to supervise is the translation into its converse 
of the wild dog’s instinct to hunt, scatter, and destroy them. It is said that 
the intense energy with which the collie pursues his translated vocation 
makes him liable, unless precautions are taken, to die prematurely of 
heart-disease.]
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 It is obvious that in the literal sense the translation 
of one language into another (and the degree in which it is 
possible) depends on the ultimate common character of the 
two. In this case that community of nature is settled already. We 
admit that the languages are human, and that therefore they 
belong to the same category; the differences are all secondary.
Thus the translation whether good or bad must always be 
valid, justifiable; we discover that we have one thing in two 
forms. And this conclusion is only strengthened if we refer 
to the original meaning of translation, which is spatial—a 
transference of position. But there is another sense in which 
translation of this kind may necessarily fail, because it cannot 
convey the subtle context of association, that Significance 
which is the highest form of meaning. As Jowett well says, ‘The 
famous dispute between Nominalists and Realists would never 
have been heard of, if, instead of transferring the platonic ideas 
into a crude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been 
truly understood and appreciated.’9
 Translation, again, may be admirable from the 
linguistic, the grammatical, and idiomatic point of view, and 
yet detestable from the literary standpoint. Only when it 
is admirable from the highest point of view does it become 
a version. And the typical example of this is the authorised 
translation of the Old Testament.
 As well remarked in an article in the Times on ‘The 
Poetry of King Alfred,’10 ‘the originality which is felt in 
Alfred’s work through the guise of translation consists largely 
in his masterful transformation of his text, like a man whose 
purpose is well known to himself and is remote from aims 
merely literary.’ The instance taken is the passage in which ‘the 
position of the Earth in the celestial system is likened to the 
yolk in an egg’:
similar to what we see in an egg;
the yolk in the midst, and yet gliding free,
the egg round about. So all the world resteth
still in its place, while streaming around
water-floods play, welkin and stars;
and the shining shell circleth about,
day by day now as it did long ago.
9  [Plato, vol. IV, p. 39 (3rd ed., 1892).]
10  [August 20, 1901.]
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The writer continues: –‘But in this simile of the egg the text 
has no part; it is a solid addition from his own stores, and it 
illustrates the purpose of his mind. He is seeking to convey 
great ideas by easy and familiar means; he is seeking to bring 
down the lore of the philosopher to the comprehension of his 
untutored folk. The egg manifests this purpose in a concrete 
and conspicuous manner, and it is a typical example of his 
teaching.’ Here we have a case of conscientious analogy.
 Just as it is the human prerogative to translate the 
organic form of appreciating what sign signifies into the 
intellectual form of intentionally interpreting symbol, and to 
translate sense-impression into the terms of its excitant, so it is 
the highest form of that prerogative to translate the intellectual 
form of interpretation into what for want of a better term may 
be called verified or disciplined mysticism, that which has passed 
through the ordeal of science.11 Also ‘mysticism’ is often the 
raw material, or at least the forerunner, the ‘onseeing’ of science. 
The dreams of alchemy have thus been transmuted into the 
achievements of chemistry, its prayer has been answered in an 
unexpected sense; it has been itself transmuted from base metal 
into gold; the dreams of astrology have become the realities of 
astronomy. We have reached no final limit in either, and are 
warned that the progress of science is never linear, but that 
the next advance (as in the biological ‘tree’) may involve new 
direction in departure. And direction is often more important 
than distance. (Welby, 1983 [1903], pp. 143-147)
Welby identifies a common element in experience in 
the human world, which she calls ‘common meaning.’ Common 
meaning is the condition for both singularity and universality 
in human signifying processes. In other words, it indicates 
the signifying material making possible the individuality or 
singularity of a sign, its specificity, its otherness and, at once, 
its universal validity for mankind. Common meaning indicates 
common signifying material, what we can also call ‘semiotic 
material’ relevant to the great multiplicity of languages, or special 
languages forming a single historical-natural language, as well 
as to different historical-natural languages, cultures and sign 
systems. Common meaning is the originating source of signifying 
processes through to the highest degrees of significance. It is 
11  [There are many signs of the advent of this, notably in recent articles 
in Nature.]
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the common foundation to all intralingual, interlingual and 
intersemiotic communication. In the face of what would seem 
to be major or minor areas of untranslatability among different 
languages, ‘common meaning’ is that which makes translation 
possible (see Petrilli, 1995, ch. XII; Petrilli, 2003a). 
We said that common meaning can be related to the 
concept of ‘common speech’ elaborated by Ferruccio Rossi- 
Landi (1961), which does not converge with the concept of 
‘ordinary language’ elaborated by English analytical philosophy. 
Indeed the latter only represents one aspect of what Welby 
understood by ‘common meaning,’ or Rossi-Landi by ‘common 
speech.’ Welby formulated her concept of ‘common meaning’ in 
the early stages of her research as emerges, for example, from a 
letter to Thomas H. Huxley written between 1882-1885: 
If I were trying to talk your language it would risk the 
absurdity—worse, the confusion—of ‘English as she is spoke’; 
but may I not ask you in virtue of what underlies all sectional 
diversity of speech, to look through my language as I look 
through yours, putting aside merely technical or secondary 
meanings, and seeking the common meaning [my own emphasis] 
of all human or natural utterance? 
 (…) I feel that to antedate a coming time, when we 
may learn the universal scope of the ‘principle of translation’ 
and share each other’s truth as we speak each other’s tongue, 
may be to risk the violation of one of the deepest of divine laws. 
(Welby / Huxley, 1882-1885, in Cust, 1929, p. 102)
 ‘Common meaning’ indicates a sort of a priori of language 
in the Kantian sense, a level of reference common to all languages, 
whether historical-natural languages or special languages, a series 
of operations constituting the condition itself for expressivity 
and communication through verbal (and nonverbal) signs. The 
expression ‘common’ indicates communion in the existent, an a 
priori (primal sense, see below), an a priori community with respect 
to the very differences it generates. All language users whether 
they are learning, teaching, translating, or simply conversing, 
activate common signifying processes and common empirical 
procedures that constitute a common ground and allow for shift 
from one universe of discourse to another, making communication 
44 TTR XX 1
Susan Petrilli
possible within and among different historical natural languages, 
within and among different special languages and everyday 
colloquial languages. Common meaning, as conceived by Welby, 
refers to all the common signifying operations that are necessary 
to speech and communication among human beings. It concerns 
all fundamental similarities, all homologies in biological and 
social structure uniting human communities beyond historical-
cultural and geographical differences and their local variations. 
In addition to common meaning, Welby also used such 
expressions as ‘common language’ and ‘common sense.’ With 
such expressions her intention was neither to underrate the great 
multiplicity of different languages, diversity among languages, 
nor reconduct such plurality to some mythical original language, 
to a sort of Ursprache, to the universal linguistic structures 
of Logos, or to some biological law governing and unifying all 
human languages. Welby explicitly criticized all attempts at 
overcoming diversity among languages and expression through 
appeal to a universal language, when such diversity was perceived 
as an obstacle to communication and mutual understanding. 
Indeed, she believed that variety and plurality among languages, 
dialects and jargons favoured reciprocal enrichment and further 
development of our linguistic-cognitive resources. Appeal to a 
universal language, whether a question of imposing an already 
existing natural language or of constructing an artificial language 
ex novo—granted such a thing were possible, was only an 
apparent solution to the question of diversity. In reality, linguistic 
and expressive diversity at large needed to be appreciated and 
explained, while problems deriving from difference and diversity 
called for attention and categories capable of accounting for 
difference and the interconnection with universality. This was a 
far cry from the idea of imposing a universal language. Indeed, 
the concepts of ‘common meaning,’ ‘common sense,’ ‘common 
language,’ and ‘common speech,’ as conceived by Welby (and 
similarly to Rossi-Landi, see his monograph of 1961), provided 
appropriate tools to deal with such issues. These tools were 
intended to explain linguistic usage and not merely describe it, 
which instead was to prove to be the limit of Oxonian analytical 
philosophy.
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In fact, these expressions refer to similarity in function 
carried out by different languages for the satisfaction of analogous 
needs of expression and communication. Different languages offer 
different expedients, solutions and resources to satisfy expressive 
and communicative functions that are essentially similar, while 
at once expressing the singularity of each language, system 
and universe of discourse. Rather than impose an artificially 
constructed universal language which meant to level linguistic-
psychological-cultural differences, Welby recognized an important 
resource for signifying, interpretive and communicative processes 
in these very differences and the practices associated with them. 
Thanks to ‘common meaning’ in Welby’s vision of the linguistic 
and non-linguistic world, differences (which generate other 
differences in an open, detotalized and continuously evolving 
totality) are not the cause of division and silence, but, on the 
contrary, call for interconnection, intertranslative processes which 
favour mutual understanding and communication across different 
languages, cultures, and value systems. As she says in What is 
Meaning?:
Granted, then, that an advance in our powers of expression, 
an enrichment of the resources of language, a greater mastery 
of significance, clearer apprehension of needless obstacles to 
mutual understanding, more effective consensus in all these 
directions is desirable: how are we to begin? The difficulty is 
that hitherto everyone who has been at all alive to the serious 
consequences of our present lack of mutual understanding 
has thought of it almost exclusively from the point of view 
of the inconvenience resulting from diversity in civilised 
languages. Many proposals of suggestions have been made 
for the acquisition of an universal language; and even now the 
adoption of neo-Latin as a common language for philosophical 
as well as scientific purposes is being urged as meeting a crying 
need. But I venture to suggest that, except in a limited sense 
or as a temporary expedient, that would be beginning at the 
wrong end. 
 For even if the whole civilised—or intelligent—
world could be brought by means of some great international 
movement to unite in the formation and consent to the use 
of such a language,—whether an old language adapted or a 
new one constructed,—it could at best but touch the surface 
of the question, and might indeed easily tend, by engendering 
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content with unworthy ideals, still further to hamper and 
discourage that development of linguistic resources for which at 
present the very variety of tongues and dialects must indirectly 
make. Many ‘ways of putting it,’ ancient and modern, are at 
least now at man’s disposal. With an artificially introduced 
and sanctioned universal language, imposed upon us at our 
present stage of linguistic development, much of this precious 
psychological heritage would wither and be wasted and lost. 
It may be that the world cannot do without that opulence of 
distinction in idiom which makes for richness in human life as 
a whole. This opulence arises from and issues in difference of 
practice, themselves valuable as providing the means of dealing 
in various ways with the emergencies of the future. The problem 
surely is, how to keep this priceless treasure without allowing it 
either to divide us, or to silence that which, being everywhere 
the highest thought of the highest man, is most of all worthy 
of expression. (Welby, 1983 [1903], pp. 211-212)
Welby did not search for monological or monolinguistic solutions 
to the problem of language difference and diversity. To signal 
an example from our own time, Chomskyian linguistic theory 
(differently from his work on ideology and social theory) prescinds 
from communicative function, that is, from the social and 
intersubjective dimensions of communicative processes. In fact, 
to explain the speaker’s capacity to produce a potentially infinite 
number of sentences on the basis of a finite number of elements, 
Noam Chomsky (1985) postulates the existence of a universal 
and innate generative grammar whose structures are biologically 
inscribed in the human mind, and is activated by experience that 
is given and simply functions as a stimulus. On the contrary, 
from the perspective of Welby’s significs and her interpretive, or 
better, pragmatic-interpretive approach to problems of meaning 
and communication, experience clearly emerges as the result of 
interpretive practices. By interpretive practices is also understood 
inferential processes of the hypothetical order, where inductive 
and deductive methods are included in one process, says Welby, 
hypothetical-deductive inference, as says Vailati, abductive or 
retroductive reasoning, in Peirce’s terminology. Through such 
interpretive processes the subject completes, organizes and 
associates data that is always more or less fragmentary, partial, 
and incomplete. Experience is all these interpretive operations. 
As such it is innovative and qualitatively superior with respect to 
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data input, that is, to the historical and social material in which 
linguistic and non-linguistic interpretive work of preceding 
generations is sedimented. And once the abductive dimension 
of experience is evidenced, including the dialectical relation 
with competence, language learning and linguistic competence 
no longer need to be explained in terms of an innate universal 
grammar. On the contrary, we can make the claim that language 
acquisition is possible on the basis of abductive inferential 
processes.
Welby denounced the acritical use of language, whether 
a question of ordinary language or of special languages, including 
the languages of metadiscourse. As she states, for example, in 
Chapter XVIII of What is Meaning?:
One of the main results of the backward state of language and 
the prevalent ‘mislocution’ is, of course, the unconscious see-saw 
of senses and meanings which goes on between the usages of 
the common-sense or practical man in the ordinary intercourse 
of life, and the usages of the scientific and philosophical teacher. 
The former freely uses words like Sense, Sensation, Feeling, 
Matter, Force, Mind, Will, in all sorts of ‘senses,’ according 
to the impulses inherited or acquired at school. These ‘senses’ 
are usually called out or suggested by experience which varies 
almost endlessly with age, circumstances, health, etc. The same 
thing happens with short sentences or conventional phrases 
embodying such terms. (Welby, 1983 [1903], p. 140).
Welby reflected on the use of the term ‘plain,’ criticizing 
the myth of ‘plain meaning,’ which was an important element in 
the construction of her own conception of language and of the 
world: ‘For one thing meaning is not, and that is “plain” in the 
sense of being the same at all times, in all places, and to all’ (Welby, 
1983 [1903], p. 143). She underlined the semantic plasticity 
of the term ‘common,’ and with such expressions as ‘common 
meaning,’ ‘common sense,’ ‘common language,’ and ‘common 
speech’ she aimed to identify the conditions of language-thought 
that make linguistic usage possible. Rather than a description of 
real processes, of the world as it is, these concepts are part of 
a theoretical construct, a model and method with interpretive 
functions, a hypothesis applicable to different languages. From this 
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perspective Welby’s work is rich in intuitions that foreground the 
research of such scholars as Rossi-Landi and his own concept of 
‘common speech,’ or his critique of the concept of ‘use’ elaborated 
by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. According to 
Rossi-Landi, Wittgenstein analyses the language unit as though 
it were already given prescinding from the real processes of social 
production from which these units ensue (see Rossi-Landi, 1968, 
Eng. trans.). Rossi-Landi developed the concept of ‘common 
speech’ in terms of work, that is, ‘linguistic work,’ and subsequently 
in terms of ‘social reproduction’ (see Rossi-Landi, 1961, 1985, 
1992). In fact, with his notion of ‘linguistic work’ he too intended 
to explain and not simply describe linguistic use. 
The idea of common signifying material concerns the 
system of techniques forming the necessary conditions for 
expression and communication, and which in their repeatability 
and constancy are common to all human beings. As such, this 
material does not have national and cultural boundaries, but, on 
the contrary, is transnational and transcultural. Indeed, to impose 
a universal language would mean to start from the wrong end, 
says Welby. ‘Common meaning’ or ‘common sense’ is not the 
theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic 
and ideologic unification and centralization, of the ‘centripetal 
forces’ of language, as Bakhtin would say, nor is it connected to 
the abstract notion of langue. As maintains Rossi-Landi (1961, 
p. 169) in his critique of the dichotomy between the system of 
language and individual speaking, between langue and parole, 
between that which is permanent in language and innovation, 
between inventum and inventio, the notion of common speech, 
understood as the constant and reproducible elements of 
language, language-in-general, human linguistic work, cannot be 
reduced to one only of the two poles forming these dichotomies, 
but involves them both.
Rossi-Landi’s notion of ‘common speech’ serves as an 
interpretant of Welby’s own common sense or common meaning 
hypothesis, which it clarifies and develops. Another interpretant 
according to a line of thought that further develops Rossi-Landi’s 
research and which seems to lead to where Welby was headed, and, 
above all, clarifies how communion, commonality, community is 
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the very presupposition for difference, is the notion of semiotic 
materiality. This expression indicates a common foundation, a 
non conventional community, open and far more extensive than 
a community based on the logic of identity. A community that 
unites different elements on the basis of common irreducible 
otherness and not of common identity—whether of class, 
profession, nation, history, memory, ethnicity, religion, politics, 
race, gender, species. 
Given that languages belong to the ‘same category’ and 
express needs that are common to humanity as much as they are 
differentiated, Welby, like Rossi-Landi, believes that translation 
is always possible. However, whilst a translation may be ‘good’ or 
‘bad,’ it must always be ‘valid’ and ‘tenable.’ In this case translation 
into the target language offers another way of more or less saying 
the same thing, developing initial meaning into a new interpretant. 
The original meaning of the term itself ‘translation’ understood 
as ‘transferral of position’ is a spatial concept, says Welby, and 
underlines the concept of the multiplication of viewpoints with 
respect to a single sign thanks to translation processes. 
Welby distinguishes between ‘translation’ and ‘version’: a 
‘translation’ may be admirable from a linguistic, grammatical and 
idiomatic point of view, or detestable from the literary point of 
view. Only when rendition is good on a literary level as well, in 
aesthetic terms, can we speak of a ‘version.’ However, the translator 
is destined to fail in his work if s/he does not succeed in rendering 
the significance of the original text in terms of the target text; 
the system of values expressed in the original, which is strictly 
connected with the cultural context in which it is conceived, must 
find expression in the translated version of that same text. But, 
obviously, not even a translation that is ‘good’ and not just ‘valid’ 
involves a relation of perfect correspondence, of identity among 
interpretants from different languages. Indeed, Welby posits the 
categories of difference and otherness as a necessary condition 
for the happy realization of any translative process whatsoever. In 
fact, as she observes in Chapter XIX of What is Meaning?, even 
when terms are as close as they can be to ‘actual identity,’ the 
relation between them always involves a margin of difference. To 
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exemplify, Welby indicates the logical procedure of equation (12 
+ 8 = 15 + 5).
Moreover, to maintain the thesis of translatability does 
not imply that in the last analysis all languages are equal to each 
other, that underlying structures are identical to each other, or that 
vocables overlap to perfection. The thesis of translatability among 
languages, which also keeps account of the ‘ultimate common 
character,’ the ‘community of nature’ uniting different languages 
by virtue of the fact that they belong to the same category, that 
is, human languages, does not at all imply keeping faith to the 
principle of linguistic universalism. The latter reconducts the 
great plurality of different languages to a single language, the 
Ursprache, to universal linguistic structures, to innate mental 
structures and, lastly, to a monological view of reality (see Rossi-
Landi, 1985, pp. 246-250, pp. 261-269). Instead, languages 
always maintain a margin of reciprocal otherness, not only in the 
obvious case of different natural languages, but also in situations 
of plurilingualism internal to the same language. Indeed, opening 
to difference, distancing, variation in viewpoint, linguistic register, 
discourse field, are all conditions for translation and expressivity 
across languages. All languages have their own specificity, are 
reciprocally other as much as they may be close in cultural terms, 
and all the same despite their otherness it is always possible to 
translate from one text to another. Indeed, translation is possible 
thanks to the relation of alterity (see Ponzio, 1981; Petrilli, 1994, 
pp. 103-107; Petrilli, 1995, ch. 3.2).
With specific reference to poetic language, while 
maintaining that poetry by definition cannot be translated, 
Jakobson himself maintains that even in the case of poetry 
translation is possible if translation is conceptualized as 
transposition: ‘Only creative transposition is possible: internally 
to a given language (or from one poetic form to another), or 
among different languages. Or intersemiosic transposition is 
possible from one sign system to another: for example, from the 
art of language to music, dance, cinema, or painting ( Jakobson, 
1971 [1959], pp. 260-266). In spite of such limitations, and 
recalling Bakhtin, we can state that translation as ‘transposition,’ 
‘transferral of position,’ as says Welby, is always possible, even if 
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not in terms of a ‘version,’ thanks to the action of otherness and 
dialogism in language.
When a question of translatability among historical-
natural languages, to ask whether or not historical-natural 
languages communicate with each other is irrelevant. As close 
as two languages may be on the level of historical formation they 
do not communicate with each other. That two languages share 
common aspects either because they are familiar with each other 
or because they share a common past in terms of formation and 
transformation processes does not eliminate differences among 
them. Nor will there necessarily be overlap between the two 
distinct universes of discourse that these languages represent. 
The right question to ask does not concern 
communication but expressibility. The problem of translatability 
is the following: can what be expressed in one language also be 
expressed in another? The reply should not be of the inductive 
order, that is, reached by verifying all cases, among all languages, 
thereby accumulating results case by case. Nor should it be of the 
deductive order, that is, made to derive from some theoretical 
premise or axiom, given that we are working in the sphere of the 
human sciences and not in some formal discipline. Instead, our 
reply must be of the abductive or hypothetical-deductive order. 
In other words, it must be reached on the basis of an inference, 
that is, a reply allowing for verification of the case in question on 
the basis of a given hypothesis. 
In this sense, to translate (this impossible communication 
among historical-natural languages) is always possible. This 
conviction is based on the metalinguistic character of language, 
verbal and nonverbal. Interlingual translation occurs in territory 
that is common to all historical-natural languages, the verbal. It 
involves intraverbal translation as much as intralingual translation. 
Therefore, interlingual translatability occurs on common ground 
and involves common practices familiar to a speaker exercised in a 
single language, that is, the practice of transverbal expressibility.
Verbal sign systems are endowed with a distinctive feature 
which differentiates them from nonverbal special languages, that 
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is, the metalinguistic capacity. Verbal sign systems can speak about 
themselves, objectivate themselves, make themselves the object 
of discourse. Availability of multiple special languages within 
a single historical-natural language augments the possibility 
of metalinguistic usage. All the same, the degree of distancing, 
therefore critical awareness, between metalanguage and object 
language as permitted by plurilingualism internal to a single 
historical-natural language is inferior to distancing achieved 
when translating across different historical-natural languages. 
Therefore, if we consider the problem of translatability in terms 
of expressibility, we must inevitably agree that the relation with 
another historical-natural language favours expressibility and that 
translation is not only possible, but even augments the speaker’s 
metalinguistic capacity.
On the other hand, to the extent that interlingual 
translation is intraverbal translation it is achieved on the basis 
of what, as anticipated, Rossi-Landi in 1961 (now 1998) called 
‘common speech.’ This expression was introduced by Rossi-
Landi to conceptualize a system of relatively constant human 
techniques, a system that is broadly international and not limited 
to national-cultural boundaries (Rossi-Landi, 1998, p. 165). 
The ‘common speech’ hypothesis clarifies that the relation of 
resemblance between the original-text and the translation-text, 
which translation must keep account of, is neither a relation of 
isomorphism nor of superficial analogy, but of homology. In 
other words, despite differences, the relation of resemblance, 
similarity or likeness bonding historical-natural languages is 
of the genetico-structural order and is determined by the fact 
that two texts from two different historical-natural languages 
share a sort of filigree, what Rossi-Landi calls ‘common speech,’ 
and Welby the ‘common character,’ the ‘community of nature’ 
uniting different languages, that is, ‘common meaning, ’ ‘common 
language.’
Thanks to the metalinguistic capacity of the verbal, 
it is always possible to reformulate what has been said, 
whether in the same special language or in the same historical- 
natural language and, even better, in a different special language 
and in a different historical-natural language. Translatability is 
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inherent in the verbal, a characteristic common to all historical-
natural languages, and is possible thanks to ‘common meaning.’ 
This position opposes those conceptions that describe historical-
natural languages as closed and self-sufficient systems, just as 
it opposes extremes in the description of differences among 
historical-natural languages in terms of ‘linguistic relativity.’ 
The question of translatability must be connected to the 
problem of the meaning of a sign and to the fact that this cannot 
be circumscribed to a single type of sign or sign system. From 
this point of view translatability may be explained in terms of 
a semiotic order. In fact, with Welby and Peirce we have seen 
that translation is implicit in the concept itself of sign. A sign is 
not possible without an interpretant, that is, without another sign 
that somehow explicates its meaning. In other words, meaning 
subsists in the relation of reciprocal translation among signs.
Theoretically there are no limits on the interpretants of a 
sign, in other words, the meaning of a sign cannot be circumscribed 
by limits of a typological or systemic order. Each time there is 
meaning there is no type of sign or sign system that cannot be 
involved to furnish the sign with ulterior interpretants. Meaning 
and translation are semiotic phenomena whether interpretation-
translation processes occur in the verbal sign system, among the 
sectorial languages of a single historical-natural language, among 
different historical-natural languages, among verbal and nonverbal 
sign systems, or among different nonverbal sign systems.
To understand the meaning of a verbal sign in our own 
historical-natural language or in a different historical-natural 
language means to activate interpretive processes involving 
interpretants which are not necessarily of the verbal order alone.
Therefore, to translate from one historical-natural 
language to another means to apply artificial limits, as it were, 
on the process: we search for interpretants exclusively among 
the verbal interpretants of the translating language of that which 
is said in a given historical-natural language. In the case of 
interlingual translation the point of arrival must necessarily be 
verbal, interpretants are chosen from the language into which we 
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are translating. However, on careful observation it is evident that 
limitation to verbal signs only concerns the goal of interpretive 
trajectories involved in interlingual translation, while the course 
of such trajectories is not at all limited to direct transition from 
one historical-natural language to another for nonverbal signs 
and value systems are inevitably also involved.
Translation difficulties should not be attributed to 
resistance of some sort by the text in translation. Translatability 
is the very condition of the life of signs. If difficulties arise this is 
because in the case of interlingual translation the interpretant is 
restricted to the sphere of the verbal, and even more specifically 
to the sphere of a single historical-natural language (the target 
language).
Translation difficulties do not arise so much from the 
fact that what is said in one historical-natural language must 
be transferred into another. The real difficulty lies in reaching 
an adequate understanding of the communicative act that 
renders the text in question possible, that renders it significant 
as a response, given that it is not self-sufficient and independent 
but presupposes more communicative relations than it actually 
installs. Before reaching the target language and finding an 
adequate interpretant, or translatant, the work of interpretation 
involved in translating a text implies a multiplicity of interpretants 
which not only do not belong to the target language but do 
not even belong to the source language. On the contrary, these 
interpretants must be traced in a great verbal and nonverbal sign 
network without any possibility of foreseeing which trajectories 
should be followed and which portions of the network should be 
explored.
As emerges from Welby’s significal approach to the 
problem of translation, interlingual translation only concerns 
the point of departure and arrival, while all the intermediary 
interpretive work is of a semiotic order. The text can only be 
‘transferred’ from one historical-natural language into another 
on the basis of intersemiotic translation. Beyond making two 
historical-natural languages communicate with each other, 
translatability depends on the explicitation of interpretants 
connecting the text in translation to communicative context. 
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5. Centrality of Translation in Semiotic Processes and 
Evolutionary Development
A sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an 
interpretation, that is, by virtue of its determining another sign 
of the same interpretant. (Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 
5.569)
In the first place to translate is to interpret. If we agree with 
Peirce that signs do not exist without an interpretant and that the 
meaning of a sign can only be expressed by another sign acting as 
its interpretant, translation is constitutive of the sign, indeed sign 
activity or semiosis is a translative process. Meaning is indissolubly 
interconnected with translation, in fact it is engendered in 
translative processes as evidenced by the description of meaning 
in terms of ‘interpretive route’ (see Petrilli and Ponzio, 2005). 
Moreoever, Welby describes the evolutionary processes of life 
in terms of translative processes of a qualitative order across 
these three levels of meaning according to an ascending degree 
in practical import, expressivity, and inferential capacity. In fact, 
development in knowledge and expressivity is not merely the 
result of accumulating data in quantitative terms, but rather of 
re-elaborating and transforming such data through the continuous 
action of translative processes in the same sign system and among 
different sign systems, verbal and nonverbal. However, translation 
as we are describing it does not only concern the human world, 
anthroposemiosis, but rather, more broadly, it emerges as a 
constitutive modality of semiosis, or, more exactly, biosemiosis. 
Translative processes pervade the entire living world, that is, the 
great biosphere. Indeed, as theorized by Welby, translation is no 
less than vital for life and its evolution in all its aspects. From this 
perspective, Welby’s translation theory is a biotranslation theory.
Chapters XXII to XXVI in What is Meaning? are centred 
on problems relevant to the evolution of mankind. Among other 
things, in these and other writings Welby deals with the linguistic 
causes of superstition among primitive peoples (see, for example, 
Welby, 1890a, 1890b) describing the evolutionary development 
of mankind from what today in light of global semiotics (see 
Posner, Robering, Sebeok, 1997-2004; Sebeok, 2001) may be 
called a biosemiotic perspective, or more specifically with Welby 
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a biosignific perspective (though the terms ‘biosemiotics’ and 
‘biosignifics’ are in a sense redundant given that global semiotics 
and significs are both constructed on the interconnection between 
the life sciences and the sign sciences). Welby examines special 
issues in the larger context of her rereading of evolutionary 
processes from a significal perspective, and describes the 
development of mankind in terms of interpretive-translative 
processes of thought, experience and behaviour into ever more 
complex and articulate intellective spheres, to the point where 
‘sense,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘significance’ at last coexist. To translate is 
neither simply to ‘decodify’ nor to ‘re-codify.’ Such operations are 
no doubt part of translative processes, but they do not exhaust 
them. 
The passage below is cited from Chapter XXV in What 
is Meaning? and together with Chapters XXII to XXVI (See 
Peirce’s comments in his review of 1903, in Hardwick, 1977, 
pp. 157-159), focuses on evolutionary issues relating to mankind, 
anthroposemiosis, in the larger context of biosemiosis. In these 
chapters Welby reflects on the linguistic causes of superstition 
among primitive peoples in a significal key, therefore in light of 
her tripartition of meaning and its evolution across the levels 
of ‘sense,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘significance.’ Different aspects of this 
meaning triad are identifiable on both the diachronic axis of 
evolutionary development as well as on the synchronic, in relations 
of interdependence among human beings forming specific socio-
cultural systems:
It may then be suggested that while the sense-scheme of 
the primitive mind was for obvious reasons more exclusively 
dominant than it afterwards became, and may be supposed to 
have reacted to more subtle appeals from the various realms of 
nature (as to the spinal was added the specifically cerebral type 
of response), the meaning-scheme, now so highly developed, 
was still embryonic; while the element of Significance, as we 
now at least tacitly recognise it, was not yet assimilated. In other 
words, the primitive form of intelligence may be supposed to 
have been sensitive to certain modes of energy, modes which 
it was incited to translate somehow into cult of some kind and 
then into formal doctrine; just as it was impelled to translate the 
sense of hunger into the taking of food, and, in a higher stage, 
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to translate the whole experience into articulate statement. 
Only, in this last class of cases, the translation, as life directly 
depended upon it, had to be the right one; in the case of the 
more indirect forms of stimulus, the translation was purely 
tentative, and was thus liable to be grotesquely wrong. Even 
where its principle survives, on the one hand in the highest 
scientific, and on the other in the highest religious, poetical, or 
philosophical thought of our own days, its earliest applications 
were repulsive as well as fantastic.
 This, however, would be, from a signific point of 
view, just what we should expect to find. Man’s sense—world 
includes much which requires the discipline of a meaning-
sense to interpret rationally; and this sense, this sensitiveness 
to the meaning, intent, purport, purpose, ‘end’ of experience, 
direct and indirect, culminates in the sense—now become the 
recognition of Significance; of the import, the importance, the 
ultimate value, the supreme moment of all experience and all 
knowledge. (Welby 1983 [1903], pp. 193-194)
6. The Unpublished Papers of 1905-1911 on Translation, 
Interpretation, Significance 
Victoria Welby insists on the question of translation and 
its centrality in interpretive processes and the generation of 
significance in some papers written during the last years of her life. 
The Welby Collection at the York University Archives contains a 
file entitled ‘Significs and Translation (i.e. Definition)’ (WCYA, 
Box 31, file 49), presenting a series of short unpublished papers 
dated from 1905 to 1911, edited for publication. All papers in 
this file, which we shall now briefly present, are appended to the 
present essay. Let me repeat that the title of this file may prove 
misleading. It should not be understood as conceiving translation 
merely in terms of definition, or reformulation as understood by 
Jakobson, but as reflection on and formulation of an approach to 
translation theory and practice which Welby understands in the 
broadest sense possible, what we have described as a significal 
and biosemiotic approach, and certainly inclusive of Jakobson’s 
concepts of ‘intralingual,’ ‘interlingual,’ and ‘intersemiotic’ 
translation.
In a paper of 13 March 1905 entitled ‘Significs and 
Translation,’ Welby focuses on the problem of evolution in 
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terms of translation (on a scale progressing from the general to 
the specific: evolution of the universe, humanity, mind, human 
intelligence, expression, etc.). In fact we know that Welby did not 
limit the problem of translation to the problem of shift from one 
language to another (interlingual translation), but far more broadly 
she theorized translation in terms of translative processes across 
different universes of discourse as well as across different types of 
sign systems, verbal and nonverbal. From a significal perspective, 
translation-interpretation involves processes of differentiation and 
specialization in sense and signifying function. Such processes are 
perfected with the appearance of mind which involves development 
of the analytical and critical capacities, therefore of the capacity 
for differentiation and construction. However, such processes do 
not involve the introduction of barriers and separations which, 
according to Welby, are human inventions introduced for the 
sake of analysis, but do not exist in nature. In Welby’s view, a 
condition for development is the recovery of the ‘intertranslative’ 
capacity among different discourses, senses and sign systems, 
which occurs in the constant and necessary dialectics between the 
tendency towards concentration, on the one hand, and continuity 
on the other, between unity and distinctions. To the same type of 
dialectics is also subject the development of significance which is 
engendered through ‘intertranslative’ processes among different 
senses, functions and values.
In ‘Translation “Upwards”,’ a paper of 25 November 
1907, Welby returns to theorizing the processes of evolutionary 
development from organic activity to mental activity in terms 
of translation. In ‘A Badly Needed Translation,’ 11 June 1908, 
she continues theorizing the idea of uninterrupted translative 
processes across the different realms of life. Evolutionary 
development is possible on the basis of translative processes from 
organic life to the life of the intellect. Welby underlines the need 
to recover the relation of dependency of mind upon biological life, 
as the condition for continuity of translative processes through to 
the highest levels of significance (see also her untitled paper in 
this file dated 11 November 1911).
The paper entitled ‘The Snares of Translation’ organized 
in the form of a dialogue among various voices (an argumentative 
expedient often used by Welby in her writings) focuses on the 
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problem of interlingual translation. Meaning is never absolutely 
simple, literal, neutral or univocal, but rather is figurative and 
intonated, therefore the meaning of words in translation processes 
from one language to another is not preestablished and cannot be 
taken for granted. Moreover, words frequently derive from other 
languages, as a result of loans and shifts from other languages, 
dialects, and universes of discourse. The implication is that we 
cannot escape the metaphorical and figurative dimension of 
meaning, that we must be aware of the action of ‘multiplex’ terms 
in linguistic practice, in the spheres of ordinary language as well 
as in specialized languages. With specific reference to translation 
processes across languages, and in light of the nature of meaning 
which shifts, develops, or loses force at the very moment of use, 
a classification of correspondences among terms from different 
languages could never be exhaustive nor definitive, and therefore 
is useless. Welby considers juridical discourse and the difficulties 
involved in translating terms from the English language that 
are not original to it into French, e.g., verdict, jury, sentence, 
conveyance.
In ‘What is Translation?,’ Welby establishes an analogy 
between the traveller who transfers himself across space in a 
physical sense and the transferral of meaning from one language 
to another. In this light, translation is described as the ‘power 
of making an identical statement or description in different 
terms,’ which enhances our ‘powers of dealing with the world by 
acquiring the power of common understanding.’ But this does 
not mean to augur a utopian world where a ‘common language’ 
is spoken with the introduction of an international language. The 
idea of developing artificial languages was at the centre of debate 
during the second half of the nineteenth century and became a 
trend of the times. A primary concern was to overcome barriers 
and separations presented by languages to the ultimate end of 
avoiding conflict and even war. Elsewhere we have discussed 
H.G. Wells’s vision of a Utopian tongue in relation to Welby’s 
view of language (see Petrilli, 2006b). Esperanto, the best known 
artificial language at the time, was introduced by Ludwig L. 
Zamenhof (1859-1917) in 1887. La Langue Bleue or Bollak was 
introduced between 1899-1902 by Leon Bollack (1859-?). New 
Latin may be ‘Latine sine flexione’, also know as Interlingua, 
was introduced in 1903, by the Italian mathematician Giuseppe 
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Peano (1858-1932) to develop a simplified Latin as a common 
language. Volapuk was invented around 1897 by Johan Martin 
Schleyer (1831-1912) (see Wells, 2005 [1905], p. 271, n. 11). In 
1929 Charles K. Ogden introduced Basic English, an international 
auxiliary language with an 850-word vocabulary for people with 
no knowledge of English (see Petrilli, 1995). 
Welby speaks of a ‘common humanity,’ but this does 
not mean to postulate and impose a ‘common language,’ such as 
Esperanto, or, in the past, Latin, sacrificing others. In a passage 
from her book of 1911, Significs and Language, Welby says she 
wants Esperanto, but naming it as an expressive resource alongside 
others including ancient Greek, literary language, and Zulu clicks 
(see Welby, 1911 [1985], p. 83). In any case, while acknowledging 
the need, indeed the inevitability of international languages, e.g. 
the telegraph code, she draws attention to the importance from 
a significal perspective of expressive wealth as determined by the 
great multiplicity of different historical natural languages as of 
all special languages, that is, by linguistic variation. Such wealth 
would be lost if variation and diversity were eliminated to create 
a situation characterized by what we identify as ‘monologism’ and 
‘monolingualism.’ In Welby’s view loss of languages coincides 
with loss in significance. 
In the ‘Final Note’ to her book of 1897, Grains of Sense, 
Welby takes her stand in the debate of the time concerning the 
problem of war and peace. By contrast with those who placed 
their hopes for peace and mutual understanding in a common 
language, Welby shifted her attention to the conditions that make 
communication and mutual understanding possible. Beyond 
the concept of common language, this led her to problematize 
the structural presence of values, sense and significance in all 
languages, therefore, in our own terminology, the capacity for 
mutual listening and hospitality towards the other present in 
all languages. Beyond physical proximity Welby postulates what 
she calls ‘mental communication’ as a necessary condition for the 
construction of an international community, that is, the capacity 
to share and communicate values. Reflecting on problems of 
communication Welby identified in mutual indifference among 
peoples, cultures and languages a determining condition for the 
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internationalization of hatred, war and destruction, sacrifice of the 
other; and in mutual listening, hospitality towards the word of the 
other, the premise for cooperation among civilizations, triumph 
of justice and international order over anarchy and extermination. 
In this context of discourse, to speak of a ‘common language’ such 
as Esperanto in Welby’s day meant, for some people, to indicate 
a possible solution to the type of misunderstanding that lead to 
war, and for others, instead, to favour tension among peoples who 
at last understood each other. Also, at the time, some people saw 
a deterrent to war in economic interdependency among countries, 
and in such phenomena as traveling abroad which were thought 
to favour transnational friendship. On her part, Welby evidenced 
the importance of sharing values and of developing critical 
consciousness, of the capacity for critical interpretation and 
creative responsibility towards the other. Such values indicated 
the way to a world consecrated to mutual understanding and 
involvement, ultimately to peaceful living based on the principle 
of mutual cooperation among peoples and nations, beyond the 
barriers of identity for a ‘new era in human thought and action’ 
(see Welby, 1897, pp. 136-142). 
Translation is transformation, transfiguration, transferral, 
transvaluation, and the difficulties of translation may also be 
attributed to the singularity or uniqueness, the otherness or 
specificity of each language, of each culture with respect to any 
other. However, such difficulties can also be overcome on the basis 
of the concepts of ‘common humanity’ and of ‘human universals’ 
(we have already signaled the connection with Rossi-Landi’s 
concept of ‘common speech’). Translation involves interpretation 
without which translation is not possible. And when we translate 
we in fact not only transfer meaning but transform and transfigure 
sense, meaning and significance in the dialectical and dialogical 
relation between the logic of otherness and the logic of identity, as 
so clearly illustrated by Welby in her paper ‘What is Translation?’ 
(see Appendix).
In ‘Translate—and Master,’ 23 May 1907, Welby 
criticizes the tendency to resignation in the name of Divine Will, 
often no more than a cover and alibi for one’s own ignorance and 
obtuseness. In the same way, she also criticizes the tendency to 
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accept untolerable contradictions. She considers poets responsible 
for exasperating such attitudes as when they consider nature as 
torturer and devourer of her own children creating mystifications 
around the concept of pain and suffering. Everything must be 
translated and mastered, including the experience of pain, in a way 
that is constructive and beneficial for all. Such logic highlights 
the close interconnection between translation, interpretation, 
knowledge, significance, critique and responsibility, a constant 
through all Welby’s writings. 
In ‘To What End?’ dated 8 June 1907, Welby identifies 
the sense of the human being’s existence in translation towards 
ever more developed spheres of thought, to ever higher spheres 
of praxis and expression. Human beings are the ongoing result 
of translative processes from vegetable and animal life through 
to the emotional and intellectual. Welby even theorizes relations 
between human beings and machines in terms of translation. 
All the same, as much as translative processes have developed 
sense beyond the level of sensorial perception to high levels of 
meaning and signifying processes through to the sense of value, 
including the moral, Welby believed that mankind had not yet 
fully recognized the potential of sense developed to the levels 
of significance. And no doubt from an evolutionary perspective, 
human beings, the masters of nature, have transcended the 
lower levels of sense as represented by vegetable and animal life 
through translative processes. Paradoxically, however, though 
equipped with the capacity for projection and development, for 
transcendence with respect to the ordinary limits of experience, 
human beings have not yet reached the maximum levels of 
expressive, cognitive, or axiological potential.
In an untitled paper of 30 May 1908, Welby also 
discusses the ‘analogical relation,’ that is, the art of establishing 
correspondences among spheres of experience, even distant from 
each other, in terms of translation. Importance of the prefix ‘trans-’ 
in the word ‘trans-lation’ for an understanding of the nature 
of translation is the subject of an untitled paper of 14 August 
1908. Welby emphasizes the nature of translation as a cognitive 
procedure through which are established relations of analogy 
and comparative transferral among ideas, problems and things 
belonging to different spheres of experience, among different 
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sign systems, thereby enhancing the interpretive, expressive and 
communicative power of language. Welby mostly supported her 
views by referring to progress in the sciences.
To theorize language from the perspective of significs, 
means to theorize language in relation to action as well as 
to values. Welby’s significs prefigures speech act theory and 
conceptualization of language in terms of communicative games as 
formulated by English analytical philosophy from approximately 
the second half of the twentieth century onwards, but in terms 
that are far more reductive with respect to her own approach 
(see Petrilli, 2006c, ch. 8). As says Welby, ‘language is only the 
supreme form of Expressive Action,’ and the play or action of 
music is related to the play or action of life itself. 
‘Expression’ and ‘communication’ call for ‘articulate 
Translation of the dialects of experience’ in their multiplicity, 
creating a verbal and nonverbal expressive apparatus that is ever 
more metaphorical and figurative. The method of association 
and combination through which experience is articulated and 
developed in all its diversity and complexity renders meaning 
ever more polyphonic and polylogic, to say it with Bakhin, and 
never ‘plain and obvious,’ as says Welby (see Petrilli, 2006c, ch. 4). 
At the same time, however, Welby theorizes the need to apply the 
principle of simplification—which can be related to Peirce’s own 
‘principle of economy’—on both the conceptual and practical 
levels. Of course, in light of Welby’s significs, simplicity is not to 
be understood reductively neither in terms of triviality nor in the 
sense of limiting signifying experience. The concluding passage 
to this paper is a good description of the close interrelationship 
between translation, interpretation, and significance as theorized 
from the perspective of significs. 
Welby’s considerations on the language of mathematics 
in a paper of 23 September 1908 entitled ‘Mathematics’ begin 
with a description of mathematics as ensuing from translative 
processes into the ‘highest region of the rational brain,’ while 
maintaining relations of dependency upon the biological or 
physiological order. On the basis of such interconnectedness 
Welby claims that the language of mathematics is not separate 
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from other languages, including ordinary language. Indeed, to 
remain efficient the language of mathematics must not isolate itself 
in its own specialism. Life in all its manifestations, including the 
human, develops in a continuum without interruptions through 
to intellectual life, and where barriers are introduced among 
different spheres of experience, thought, among different languages, 
bridges must be reconstructed and interconnections recovered in 
relations of reciprocal, we might add, ‘dialogical’ enhancement. 
The mathematician who closes to the ‘commonwealth of interests’ 
and confines himself to his own ‘technically perfect method’ 
loses sense in terms of humanity as well as of mathematics. The 
more the mathematical processes of abstraction, theorems, 
and technical symbols are perfected, the more mathematical 
language must be integrated by ‘ordinary language.’ Ordinary 
language is necessary to speak about mathematical discoveries 
and communicate them to others, as well as to interpolate 
mathematical discourse in the interpretation of relations between 
one problem and another, between one standpoint and another. 
Speaking of the work of the mathematician, Welby observes that 
‘His very abstractions, as they rise in complexity, delicacy and 
creative coherence, lose something that other thought activities 
can contribute; and among these the figurative or analogical, the 
image—as retinal infidelity, or the comparison—as condition 
of choice.’ The language of mathematics inevitably makes use 
of ordinary language which must maintain its ‘plastic vitality’ 
in order to serve its different purposes, as in the case of the 
language of Augustus De Morgan and Bertrand Russell. Welby 
claims that through the significal method ‘the thinker will pass 
easily from the one medium to the other, and thus contribute 
to the construction of bridges between mathematical and other 
forms of thought which will pass easily from the one medium 
to the other, and thus contribute to the construction of bridges 
between mathematical and other forms of thought which shall 
enormously enrich the human inheritance.’ An example of 
this type of translation is the application of mathematics to 
mechanics. With the method of significs, says Welby, ‘applied 
mathematics’ responds to the specialism of the mathematician 
while at once involving competencies of the non specialist: ‘For 
here, as everywhere, Significs means the intensification of that 
Sense of Significance which is at once the simplest and the most 
complex of our responses to the Arousers of Interest, the Calls 
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to which we are embodied potential Answers. What does all this 
imply? That the ‘Pure Mathematician’ is a greater man than he 
knows, but is only doing half his work,—the segregative isolative 
half.’
These papers by Welby echo and develop ideas that she 
had already expressed in various places of her writing, including 
her correspondence. For example, her critique of specialisms 
and separations, and quest to uncover interconnections already 
inscribed in different fields of thought and languages, thereby 
recovering relations of reciprocal enhancement (a position that 
prefigures today’s quest for inter- and transdisciplinariness as 
theorized by Sebeok with his project for global semiotics), is 
anticipated in her exchanges with Victor V. Branford during the 
years 1902-1904:
For the moment I am most interested in your idea of 
‘translating’ the ideas of one group of studies into the 
nomenclature of another. This of course is one of the oldest 
problems of philosophy, but your way of approaching it is 
new. And there never, it seems to me, was so much need as 
today for special efforts to be made for bringing together on a 
common understanding groups of specialists who are in danger 
of becoming literally unintelligible to one another, not only in 
the details of their specialisms (as is doubtless inevitable), but 
also in the underlying principles. (Victor V. Branford to Welby, 
1902-1904, in Cust, 1931, p. 70)
In ‘Question of the Limits of Possible Translation,’ 20 
December 1908, Welby criticizes bad translations and warns 
against mistranslations which imply misconceptions and 
misinterpretations. Yet again she insists on the importance of a 
‘significal critique of language’ and mastery over our expressive 
resources for an adequate development of ‘articulate expression,’ 
therefore of ‘articulate communication’ as a condition for progress 
and full development of human creativity in all its expressive 
potential. ‘Articulate communication’ is closely connected with 
‘expressive action,’ including the nonverbal. Moreover, keeping 
account of progress in science, ‘articulate communication is every 
day extending its range and its importance,’ making mastery over 
our expressive resources ever more urgent. Without aiming at 
‘pedantic or priggish precision,’ Welby underlines the importance 
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for our ‘masters of style’ of uniting aptness or consistency in our 
use of illustrative or suggestive terms to the search for beauty and 
expressive dignity as established by given conventions. In other 
words, sense, meaning and significance must not be sacrificed, 
not even in the case of literary writing, to the sounds and 
rhythms of language which transmit and induce emotions in turn 
translated into writing. Welby posits the correct use of language 
as a criterion and limit to possible translation also in the case of 
literary writing.
By ‘translation’ Welby broadly understands ‘interpreta-
tion,’ or better, as she says in an untitled paper of 14 December 
1910, ‘interpretations through translation.’ Translations through 
the various realms of experience empower the signifying capacity 
in the quest for significance. In Welby’s view this capacity is not 
yet fully developed due to negation of so-called ‘primal sense,’ 
or what in this paper she also calls ‘native’ sense—the original 
source of ‘fecundating significance’ (on primal sense or mother-
sense, see Petrilli, 2006c, ch. 8). The method of significs consists 
in ‘reading one form of experience—inductive and deductive and 
by the light of another,’ thereby stimulating the central signifying 
function, the essential condition for humanity’s centrifugal and 
transcending creativity. 
With reference to the problem of subjectivity, such a 
perspective involves a shift from polarization in the usurper self, 
closed in upon its own identity, to the condition of opening of the 
I which is constructed in the relation to the other. If the end of 
any experience is ‘fecundating significance’ and therefore the 
coming to awareness of its value and signifying power, then the 
central question continues to be ‘what does it signify?.’ The concept 
of ‘fecundating significance’ is taken up again in the last untitled 
paper dated 11 November 1911 closing this collection dedicated 
to ‘Significs and Translation.’ In this paper, Welby continues her 
critique of oppositions of the type, inner world-outer world, 
inside-outside, upper-lower, to the advantage of a vision of the 
existent where distinctive units are not considered as separate and 
isolated, but as terms of a relation which respond to each other as 
interconnected parts of the same universal continuum.
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7. Biographical and bibliographical note on Victoria Welby
Welby [later Welby-Gregory; née Stuart-Wortley], Victoria 
Alexandrina Maria Louisa, Lady Welby (1837–1912), philo-
sopher, was born in England on 27 April 1837, the last of three 
children of Charles James Stuart-Wortley (1802–1844), and 
his wife, Lady Emmeline Charlotte Elizabeth Stuart-Wortley, 
née Manners (1806–1855), poet and traveller. James Archibald 
Stuart-Wortley (1776–1845) was her grandfather. She had little 
formal education aside from some private tuition, and from 
1848 to 1855 she travelled widely with her mother in the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Spain, Morocco, Turkey, Palestine, Syria 
and many other countries. In 1852 she published her travel diary. 
After her mother’s death she lived with a succession of relatives 
before being taken in by her godmother, the duchess of Kent, 
mother of Queen Victoria. In 1861 she was appointed maid of 
honour to Queen Victoria; she spent almost two years at the 
royal court before her marriage at St George’s Church, Hanover 
Square, London, on 4 July 1863, to William Earle Welby 
(1829–1898), military official, MP, and high sheriff, who with 
his father’s death in 1875 became fourth baronet and assumed 
the additional surname Gregory. Consequently Victoria Welby’s 
surname became Welby-Gregory. Alternatively to a series of 
pseudonyms or recourse to anonymity, she mainly published 
under her full name until the end of the 1880s, under the name 
of Hon. Lady Welby from 1890 to 1892, and as Victoria Welby 
from 1893 onwards, although she continued signing all official 
and business documents with her full name.
Welby’s children were Victor Albert William (1864–
1876), Charles Glynne Earle Welby (1865–1938), assistant 
under-secretary of state at the War Office and MP, and Emmeline 
Mary Elizabeth (Nina; 1867-1955), painter, sculptor, and writer, 
who wrote Welby’s biography and edited her correspondence in 
two volumes, under her married name, Mrs H. Cust. During the 
first years of her marriage, Victoria Welby founded the Royal 
School of Art Needlework.
Not at all attracted to life at court, after her marriage 
Welby retreated to Denton Manor, Grantham, where she soon 
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began her research, with her husband’s full support. Initially her 
interest was directed towards theological questions and in 1881 
she published Links and Clues, which expressed her sympathy 
at that time with evangelical movements. It was unorthodox 
and unsuccessful and its poor reception caused her to reflect on 
the inadequacies of religious discourse, which was, she came to 
believe, cast in outmoded linguistic forms. She was drawn into 
an examination of language and meaning, and found a pervasive 
linguistic confusion which stemmed from a misconception of 
language as a system of fixed meanings, and which could be 
resolved only by the recognition that language must grow and 
change as human experience changes. She also made a serious 
study of science, believing that important scientific discoveries 
supplied the new experiences by which religious discourse could 
be transformed into something more meaningful.
Central to Welby’s philosophy was her analysis of 
meaning into three components: sense—“the organic response 
to environment” (Hardwick, 1977, p. xxii); meaning—the specific 
sense which a word is intended to convey; and significance—
which encompasses “the far-reaching consequence, implication, 
ultimate result or outcome of some event or experience” (ibid.). 
This triadic relationship relates closely to that established by 
Charles S. Peirce between immediate interpretant, dynamical 
interpretant, and final interpretant (ibid., pp. 109-111). Peirce read 
her 1903 book What is Meaning? and reviewed it for The Nation 
alongside Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Mathematics, to which 
he compared it in importance. A flourishing correspondence 
developed between Welby and Peirce, which was crucial to 
the development of his thought. She has been regarded as the 
“founding mother” of semiotics and her continuing importance is 
illustrated by the publication in the 1980s and 1990s of editions 
of her work and volumes of commentary on her thought. She 
contributed significantly to modern theories of signs, meaning, 
and interpretation, and introduced, in 1896, the neologism 
“significs” to denote the science of meaning. Significs examined 
the interrelationship between signs, sense—in all its signifying 
implications—and values.
Besides numerous articles in newspapers, magazines, 
and scientific journals (notably The Spectator, The Exposi tor, the 
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Fortnightly Review, the Open Court, Nature, Mind, The Monist, 
the Hibbert Journal, and the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods) Welby published a long list of privately printed 
essays, parables, aphorisms, and pamphlets on a large range of 
subjects in numerous spheres: science, mathematics, anthropology, 
philosophy, education, and social issues.
As her research progressed, Welby increasingly promoted 
the study of significs, channelling the great breadth and variety 
of her interests into a significal perspective. Shortly after the 
publication of two fundamental essays—“Meaning and metaphor” 
in 1893 and “Sense, meaning and interpretation” in 1896—the 
Welby prize for the best essay on significs was announced in the 
journal Mind in 1896 and awarded to Ferdinand Tönnies in 1898 
for his essay “Philosophical terminology” (1899-1900). Important 
moments of official recognition for significs are represented by the 
publication of the entries “Translation” (Welby, 1902), “Significs” 
(co-authored with J.M. Baldwin and G.F. Stout, 1902), and 
“Sensal” (with G.F. Stout, 1902) in the Dictionary of Philosophy 
and Psychology in Three Volumes (1901–1905). However, the official 
recognition Welby had so tenaciously hoped for came only after 
approximately thirty years of “hard labour,” with the publication 
of the entry “Significs” in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1911. 
The signific movement in the Netherlands, which developed 
in two phases from 1917 to 1926 and from 1937 to 1956, 
originated from Welby’s significs through the mediation of the 
Dutch psychiatrist, poet, and social reformer Frederik van Eeden 
(1860–1932).
From 1863 until her death in 1912 Welby was a friend 
and source of inspiration to leading personalities from the 
world of science and literature. She wrote regularly to over 450 
correspondents from diverse countries including Great Britain, 
the United States of America, France, Italy, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. It was largely through such correspondence that 
she developed her theories. She began writing to politicians, 
representatives of the church, aristocrats, and intellectuals as 
early as 1870 and created an epistolary network which expanded 
rapidly from 1880 onwards, both locally and internationally. She 
used this network for her own enlightenment, as a sounding 
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board for her own ideas, and as a means of circulating her own 
ideas and those of others. Thanks also to her social position and 
court appointment as maid of honour to Queen Victoria, she 
counted friends and acquaintances among the aristocracy and 
government officials. Because of her interest in religious and 
theological questions she corresponded with leading churchmen 
of her day and subsequently with eminent scientists, philosophers, 
and educationists, whom she welcomed into her home where 
they met to discuss their ideas. Her correspondents included 
Michel Bréal, Bertrand Russell, C.K. Ogden, Herbert Spencer, 
Thomas Huxley Benjamin Jowett, F.H. Bradley, Henry Sidgwick, 
H.G. Wells, and William James. None the less, in spite of general 
awareness of the importance and originality of Welby’s work, 
she did not for many years receive the recognition she hoped for, 
at least not publicly. In an attempt to avoid flattery, she either 
published anonymously or signed her work with pseudonyms, 
various combinations of initials, or simply as Victoria Welby. The 
only honour she valued was ‘that of being treated by workers as 
a serious worker’ (Hardwick, 1977, p. 13). Though she had no 
institutional affiliations, she was a member of the Aristotelian and 
Anthropological societies and was one of the original promoters 
of the Sociological Society between 1903 and 1904.
Welby was an open-minded female intellectual in the 
Victorian era despite—or, perhaps, thanks to—her complete lack 
of a formal education, which led her to search for the conditions 
which made her theoretical work possible. She highlighted the 
importance of her extensive travels as a child with her mother, 
which often took place in dramatic circumstances and ended with 
her mother’s tragic death in the Syrian desert, leaving Victoria all 
alone until help came from Beirut. In a letter of 22 December 
1903 to Peirce, who fully recognized her genius (as testified by 
their correspondence), Welby suggested that her unconventional 
childhood ‘accounts in some degree for my seeing things in a 
somewhat independent way. But the absence of any systematic 
mental training must be allowed for of course in any estimate 
of work done. (…) I only allude to the unusual conditions of my 
childhood in order partly to account for my way of looking at 
and putting things: and my very point is that any value in it is 
impersonal. It suggests an ignored heritage, an unexplored mine. 
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This I have tried to indicate in What is Meaning?’ (Hardwick, 
1977, pp. 13-14).
Welby’s scientific remains are now mainly deposited 
in two archives: the Welby Collection in the York University 
archives (Downsview, Ontario, Canada) and the Lady Welby 
Library in the University of London Library. The latter includes 
approximately 1000 volumes from Victoria Welby’s personal 
library and twenty-five pamphlet boxes containing pamphlets, 
reprints and newspaper cuttings, religious tracts, sermons, and 
published lectures by various authors. Four boxes without numbers 
contain duplicates of most of Welby’s own publications. The 
main part of her scientific and literary production is to be found 
at the York archives. Half of the collection consists of Welby’s 
as yet mostly unpublished correspondence covering the years 
1861-1912. A large part of the remainder comprises notes, extracts, 
and commentaries on a variety of subjects—biology, education, 
ethics, eugenics, imagery, language and significance, logic and 
significance, matter and motion, numbers theory, philosophy 
and significance, significs, and time. There are also speeches, 
lessons, sermons by other authors, numerous unpublished essays 
and a collection of poems by Welby, diagrams and photographs, 
translations, proofs, copies of some of her publications, and 
newspaper cuttings.
Suffering from partial aphasia and paralysis of the right 
hand owing to bad blood circulation caused by flu caught at the 
end of January 1912, Welby died on 29 March 1912 at Duneaves, 
Mount Park, Harrow, and was buried in Grantham, Lincolnshire, 
England.
University of Bari
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Appendix: Victoria Welby’s Unpublished Manuscripts, written 
between 1905-1911, on Significs and Translation12
13 March 1905
Significs and Translation
As in the evolutionary ascent our senses become more sharply 
differentiated, two things happen. 1) The universe tends to ‘fall 
to pieces’ (and it is a fall) and 2) the difficulty of concentration 
by mutual reinforcement and translation becomes greater. It is 
as though a commander were defeated because on occasion he 
could not turn his infantry into cavalry or either into artillery (or 
vice versa) and thus was actually encumbered instead of aided 
by the distinctions in function of his forces. Now in the original 
sense-state wherein in a sense the living ‘cell’ felt-touched-smelt-
heard-saw and besides that responded to the real in nameless 
ways, this intertranslation was, on a very low level, possible. Hence 
survival; hence the preservation of the amazing ‘can be’ or may be, 
which science calls the potential, the very power to differentiate, 
to elaborate, to develop ever—brainwards. Life insists upon 
Mind, and that as ever-growing and ever greater in analytical, 
discriminative, constructive powers. But there is a price to pay. 
How bridge the ‘gulfs’ or surmount the barriers thus created? In 
nature, as we are incessantly reminded by science, there are none, 
and no rigid lines of demarcation. They are put there by imperious 
‘mind’ for its own convenience. It has to work in sections, just as 
number has to be made up of units.
What nonsense we talk about not having advanced 
in intellect since the days of the Greek triumphs! In the first 
place, the date of that outflowering is in the history of man but 
yesterday. In the second, we have been recoiling since, in order to 
spring further. We have been sharpening our tools and reshaping 
our instruments and reconstructing our machinery. That is the 
significance of the ‘mechanical’ age. The literal machinery like the 
12 Welby Collection, Box 31, File 49, York University Archives, Toronto. 
All papers in the file are presented here except for two, one entitled 
“Mathematics”, dated 23 September 1908, the other, dated 11 November 
1911, is untitled and closes the collection.
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means of literal locomotion is a projection of mental tendency. 
And we have been re-learning to detect: training ourselves to 
discover and observe the smallest trace or hint of ‘actual fact’; and 
(yet more important), to criticise relentlessly our own observation. 
Now we have a fresh lesson to learn, that of a significance itself: 
no longer as vague and simple (for the very idea is still in the 
embryonic stage) but as full of pregnant distinction, like for 
instance that between Image, Sign, and Symbol or that between 
Sense, Signification, and Meaning. But to do this we must learn 
to translate inter-sensally and inter-functionally. As we learn to 
translate sight into hearing, and feeling into both, so we must 
learn to translate emotion into intellect and both into will and 
conversely. Thus shall we learn how to translate mathematics 
and physics into poetry, religion, ethics; thus shall we learn how 
to translate philosophy into science, and all this again both 
backwards and forwards.
And consequently and finally, we must acquire terms 
which shall include such diversities, and signalise the change of 
orientation which has come and is coming about. Thus we shall 
begin to see that there is no question of giving up reason for 
will and desire, or of giving up emotion and imagination for the 
critical and dialectical intellect: no question of realism v. idealism, 
or of physics v. metaphysics. 
Even the morbid may in that day have its significance; 
and even in some forms when better understood, be found to 
supplement and enrich the witness of the normal. What we call 
brain disturbance or disease or defect or abnormal development 
involving loss of balance and loss of hold on the precious consensus 
of average commonplace common-sense, may in some cases be the 
preliminary disturbance and the first indications—culminating it 
may well be in an agony of birth-pang—of some great generative 
advance in human reaction to those illimitable excitations of the 
real universe of which directly we perceive so little, but of which 
science is perpetually and insistently preaching to us.
There is a tremendous Schooling in front of us! Are we 
ready to allow a really ‘transcendent’ training to educate us, to educe 
powers as yet latent, and not even expressible in an antiquated 
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terminology, which by reaction on our ideas is compelling us to 




When we cross the channel, we find that we no longer ask for 
bread, but for pain (which in its spelling arouses an unfortunate 
association!); no longer for meat but for viande; no longer for 
vegetables but for legumes.
If however we had always assumed that there could be 
but one right form of speech, that all others were but gibberish: 
or again, if outgrowing this we assumed a final difference, an 
insurmountable barrier between various languages,—so that it 
was impossible to say in one what it was a matter of course to say, 
even admirably, in another—we should, as travellers in the actual 
bodily sense be almost exactly in the position which, as thinkers 
and workers, is actually ours.
Now of course in a given family of languages there are 
plenty of words (as of idioms) which vary but slightly, so that we 
can at once detect their common sense. But outside the language 
family or class, we have no such help. 
What then are we to do? We must contrive to render 
the one language into the other: we must discover, anyhow for 
practical purposes, how to state any given fact, ask for any given 
object, describe any given need, process, appearance, in terms 
perhaps totally different from those which are ‘native’ to us. And 
we call this Translation.
What then is Translation—this wonderful power of 
making an identical statement or description in different terms, 
thus securing benefits of the first order of importance and 
enlarging our powers of dealing with the world by acquiring the 
power of common understanding? We naturally, of course, think 
of it as a secondary matter, even a mere question of convenience of 
intercourse. We naturally assume that there is yet a better way; and 
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to save trouble would give a Utopian world a common language. 
Well, of course up to a certain point this is an obvious need and 
boon, as we see e.g. in the case of the international telegraph 
code; and it is absurd that we should ever have submitted to be 
without what is so easily provided; a provision which we once saw 
in Latin and now see in Esperanto.
But even this only applies to a certain family or group 
of languages. There seems no possibility of a world-wide Latin 
or Esperanto, providing for all needs; unless indeed there is an 
unobserved eliminating process going on which will eventually 
kill all but one family of speech. In any case, this would mean one 
of the greatest losses possible to Man. We are waking up to this 
fact in the discovery of the rapid loss of local dialect and accent, 
and of native languages like Gaelic and Erse, &c. It means a loss 
of enriching Variation: it means reduction to dead uniformity. 
We are even attempting an artificial preservation of some of 
the vanishing languages and dialects. But do we realise the true 
and ultimate nature of the loss as one of a mine of significance? 
Do we remind ourselves insistently enough of the need we feel 
of quoting; of saying something in another language or in a 
different occupational dialect, which cannot be so well said in our 
own? This is an intimate psychological need. We excuse ourselves 
for much quoting from other—mainly classical—languages (a 
temptation from which most of us, from ignorance, are free) 
because we cannot translate. Now the words best worth quoting 
are the most human, and therefore of most universal interest. 
Why therefore cannot we translate them? Because of the deep 
psychological, arising from physiological, differences which have 
generated variations in modes of expression, and which make for 
a needed wealth of distinction.
Yet there is a way of overcoming such difficulties. 
Beneath all other differences there is a common humanity—a 
truism little in practice recognised. The question. ‘If you tickle us, 
do we not laugh?’ applies all over the world. There is an enormous 
stock of universally human riches not yet drawn upon. They are 
overlain with a thick crust of convention. We have hardly begun 
to translate, because we have hardly begun to interpret.
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Once more, then, What is Translation? The first thing to 
understand clearly and emphatically is that the important point 
lies here—as so often—in the prefix; the ‘Trans-.’ Whether we 
translate, transfer, transmit, transform, transmute, transfuse, and 
so on, we are always concerned, as common life and the dictionary 
tells us, with an across, athwart, over, beyond, on the other side 
of, through.
Among the abundant linguistic forms which automatically 
reveal the central place of change-bringing movement in our 
experience, transformation comes nearest to translation. The latter, 
indeed, is originally, like its congeners, a question of space and of 
removal. The thing moved remains the same. But transformation 
changes form as transfiguration changes figure; and these, while 
preserving identity, is what we need.
This then is our demand: a practical and scientific 
translation which implies a true transformation and often 
transfiguration, and yet carries over all the value of the translated 
dialect of mind. But this, we see, is more than translation; which 
indeed is a mere transference of meaning, of what it is intended 
to convey, from one set of symbolic sounds or their written 
equivalents, to another.
We ought to speak of transforming French into English, 
and still more of transforming a ‘dead’ language into a ‘living’ one. 
And the process may be (1) Literal, (2) Liberal (or general), (3) 
Significal. The last is our pressing need.
We must translate not merely speech but its raison d’être, 
its sense, its meaning, its significance.
23 May 1907
Translate—and Master
How often we dignify our own ignorance and dulness with the 
name of the Divine Will and are, alas resigned to it! How often 
we permit contradictions in conception which ought not to be 
tolerated for a moment: The poets, instead of helping us here, 
hinder us. They take up for instance the ludicrous inconsistency 
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of calling Nature the Mother—which ‘she’ is—and making her 
the typical Waster, Torturer, Devourer of her children, evolving 
‘heart-strings’ only to wring them, nerves only to intensify 
suffering, mind only to add a fiendish sting by reflection, memory, 
anticipation: by its before and after, its bitter recollections, bitter 
forebodings—bitter resentment and rebellion.
Sufferings? Nature says, Suffer me—to teach and lead you 
by Endurance and by rising through the very burden—bearing of 
motherhood which you would outgrow: the bearing of new life. 
Conceive and bear!
But more. Nature says, If I did not intensify suffering 
you would be even more contented than you are with the thick 
stifling darkness of ignorance which denounces the loyal learner 
and calls his passion that of a prying curiosity…
The office of Pain is to cry, Learn, learn! Of the children, 
of a natural order, of all clear and holy, pure and innocent, keen, 
penetrative, victorious thought. You are not to bear, not to suffer 
in its present untranslated sense. The ascetics and the martyrs 
have at least discovered this paradox, though they have done it 
wastefully: they have discovered that pain may be strangled by a 
fierce frontal attack or captured and enslaved by an ambuscade. 
And then they have found it silently smiling upon them and 
turning into a mountain path-way, while the broad road of flat 
ease and pleasure was always suggesting the nausea of satiety and 
the dying down of the precious conquered Good; ours through 
strenuousness which rises through the zone of ‘pleasure and pain’ 
to a greater stimulus than either, to that which shows both to us 
very far away, in the dim gone by and done with…
Translate—and master.
O wretched race that we are, ever turning from the Gate of 
Life and falling short of the Why of things, because our reaching 
out is so half-hearted and so faithless, and we know not what we 
say! Well, it is a great thing that we can so reproach ourselves, as 
some of our race have seen. For the pride of race must awake: we 
belong to the stars and sun: shame on our pretty gropings, our 
78 TTR XX 1
Susan Petrilli
unworthy ideals—and reals. The idealist is a byword, and he gives 
back scorn to the realist. In truth man appeals to Halfness and to 
Halfness he shall go. But wholeness, like Nature his Mother, is 
waiting—to make him Whole. 
[Undated typescript]
The Snares of Translation
(A) I suppose ‘verdict’ in this French sentence, ‘qui 
formule le décret ou promulgue le verdict’ is one of many words 
borrowed back from English usage.
(B) O, but verdict is as much French as English. It is the 
decision of the Judge.
(A) But in England it is given by Jury, not Judge: and the 
Jury is not French.
(C) But ‘verdict’ is simply ‘true saying,’ and verdict is 
Latin, which has come to use through Norman French.
(B) Yes: there is no question of technical meaning or 
borrowing; verdict is a word in general use.
(A) But only in general use metaphorically and among 
cultivated people.
(B) Not at all: I dispute that; there is no question of 
metaphor in the matter.
(A) Unless you are speaking from knowledge obtained 
by enquiry, you may find that a risky question to beg. Jury also 
is in use on the same borrowed and metaphorical footing. You 
speak, (a shade more jokingly than of ‘verdict,’ of the ‘jury’ 
of friends you have assembled to decide on a new wall-paper. 
‘Sentence’ again, like ‘conveyance’ is on a much broader ground. 
But one has to hazard even this much. No assertion is safe on this 
subject, for it is almost entirely unexplored, and Dr. Murray’s is 
practically the only Dictionary which has attempted to actualise 
some and deliteralise other current expressions. No one supposes 
of course that we could ever have an exhaustive, still less a 
lasting classification; in the very act of making it, we should find 
Language shifting, yielding, growing, withering, under our feet.
Yet we should at least learn to fear reckless rushing in, 
and at all events to tread gently where we have hitherto been 
quite sure that ‘of course we knew and everybody knows’ where 
79TTR a 20 ans / TTR Turns 20
Translation, Interpretation, and Common Meaning
the limits and what the work and effects of metaphor and the 
figurative really are. We should be a little less disastrously prompt 
with our ‘of course’s’ and our repudiation of any possible confusion 
in the use of the very ‘multiplex’ terms which form our colloquial 
and literary currency. And this is already the case with all our 




What are we here for? To what end is Man born?
To translate upwards, in faithful obedience to the law 
that brought man into being—helpless, bare, defenceless, yet 
victorious—the Survival of the Fittest in an ever-rising sense of 
phrase. ‘When I am weak then I am strong.’ What else as a man 
can I be?
Man is the Master Paradox; let him see that he realises 
this. There are wanton paradoxes; and by all these the Human 
Being ‘himself ’ is the greatest he knows, little as he yet know 
even true himself, much less its possessor. He is here as having 
translated Vegetative and brutal strength into emotional and 
intellectual strength. He is stripped of the lower to be robed in 
the higher: he has surmounted the lesser sense-world and entered 
the larger, the moral, sense-world. Like the mother-animal which 
foreshadows, predicts him, he gives up the meaner to enter the 
noble life: he learns what worth really is and thus what is and 
what may be for him both attainable and worthy.
But first we must realise as we have not yet done—clearly, 
vividly, delicately, practically, unmistakeably—the wealth of 
sense in which a phrase or a word is true and connotes the 
real. Sometimes, often indeed, this wealth of Sense makes for a 
dangerous poverty. Our hearer has too much choice, when he and 
the speaker both think he has none. In many cases we must have 
if not a new symbol, some distinguishing sign on the old symbol, 
to show in which of many senses we are using it. 
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But first let us realise not only the various ‘senses’ in which 
the word or phrase may be used, but also the absence of any hard 
and fast line of demarcation between those senses. We must be 
educated to realise here the borderlands instead of dangerously 
ignoring them. And this perhaps notably in the moral world, 
which is the world of motives and moment, the realm of the 
Sovereign Dynamic.
It is our motives and not merely our words or our actions 
that ultimately signify. Symptoms have to be interpreted, ‘disease’ 
has to be traced into the hidden evils that produce them. How 
obvious, how commonplace it sounds! And yet we are a long 
way from that in the moral judgements which we teach our 
children—who instinctively know better—to form.
Now actions, like words are indeed for practical purpose 
the immediate criterion. But when a man approaches us with a 
knife we have to decide swiftly whether he means, that is intends, 
to kill us or release or heal us. His action is ambiguous, because it 
may have many or at least alternative senses. So with an animal, 
let us say our dog, which appears to attack but is playing with or 
even trying to save us. 
Motive is the one moral thing, and in the end the 
strongest of all things; and the meaning of this ascends from the 
mechanical to man or again descends in a wonderful sweep of 
translative achievement, from man to machinery. Furthermore in 
man it is not only volitional but moral: and the Best becomes 
the strongest to survive: the cosmical Will is done. When we are 
weak in one, the lesser and lower sense, then are we strong in 
another, the greater and higher sense.
25 November 1907
Translation ‘Upwards’
In us organic activities have been, —as our ‘brains’ grew—more 
and more ‘translated’ into mental ones. Those great organic 
muscles, our physiological hearts, continue to pump: but our 
emotional ‘hearts’ have learnt in organic translation to beat with 
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enthusiasm and to thrill with sympathy. Our fathers indeed aptly 
spoke of our ‘bowels’ of compassion.
Our ‘feet’ have learnt to walk in true ways, or again they 
may make false steps and we stumble, stagger, or fall on the paths 
of moral life. Our fate may be in our own ‘hands,’ or the hands of 
others, and we handle, practically or theoretically, the problems 
of life.
But it is needless to labour this statement of natural 
process in translation of the organic into the mental. Let 
us only—translatively—open our ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ to the true 
significance and application of this automatic racial translation 
of the organic into the mental world—and then let us see that 
we do it loyally and in order, not casually and chaotically or in 
no longer relevant forms, as, alas, in linguistic ‘translation’—in 
imagery—we are now doing.
30 May 1908
Translation
If the real art of poetic (or prosaic) translation from one idiom 
or speech into another is still to seek, much more to seek is, not 
merely the art but the fully developed function of analogical 
translation, the expression of corresponding character in widely 
differing forms and regions of experience. The mastery of this, 
one of the greatest of the human gifts, is comparable indeed 
only to reason itself, which is often dependent on its secret and 
unrecognised working for good and evil. We instinctively or 
deliberately assume some correspondence or at least likeness 
between two facts or events or sequences. We even use the terms 
of the one to express or convey ‘figuratively’ or ‘metaphorically’ 
the idea of the other. 
Passing from the known to the unknown, the condition of 
all knowledge and all advance, we make comparison, whether we 
will or no, the very key of mental life; the spring of all invention 
and all application of discovery. But this carries two dangers. 
We may suppose a rigid, mechanical, technical correspondence 
where there is something much higher because more plastic and 
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productive,—a Significant one. Or again we may suppose all 
analogy, all metaphor, all images, to be merely the accident or 
ornament of popular exposition, solely of passing and pictorial 
utility or rhetorical adornment. Meanwhile it is impressive; it 
arrests attention, it appeals to population notions and habits, or 
again being decorative it makes for persuasive attraction: all this is 
at once its advantage and its drawback, its service and its danger. 
Realising this, one would suppose that every civilised 
child would be brought up to look upon a comparison, an 
apparent likeness, similarity, correspondence, as one of the most 
important things in the world, far more important than spelling 
or grammar; as important as emphasis. We should all be pointing 
out that a true analogy was that of using one thing to define or 
describe another, in order to throw light upon it and gain help 
or warning from it; that it is a question of opening a shutter or 
bringing a lamp; it illuminates and illustrates; it clears up, it shows 
us the way. This very image of ‘light’ is a case in point. But in fact 
we are brought up or left with the idea that analogy or image was 
a casual factor in speech; better, if not left alone, at least treated as 
merely incidental and if pressed or carried out, dangerous.
11 June 1908
A Badly Needed Translation
Life as vegetal has the power of transfiguring the mineral and 
gaseous world into the living. As animal, it has lost his power, and 
become parasitic on plant or animal life. ‘Mind’ in its turn has 
lost the power of direct assimilation from nature, and as language 
witness is compelled, in order to function, to live upon animal 
experience. That is, mind can do nothing unless it ‘feeds’ upon 
organic experience, besides being found in some connection or 
correlation with what we call a ‘brain.’ What is That, in its turn, 
which is in the same relation to mind—that is, which represents 
the next step in ascent, dependent on the last? At present we have 
but obscure hints and suggestions of this.
Sometimes we call it spirit. Probably we are more right 
than we know. Life depends in a special sense upon the air, 
breath: mind depends upon Life: is not the next higher stage 
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dependent on Mind? And is not the refinement of atmosphere 
to be translated upwards stage after stage, until the enormous 
temperatures and all the incalculable energies which mind 
indirectly detects through instruments which it invents and 
through its power to ‘reason’ upon the messages of these, are 
found to be the natural environment of the next higher step of 
the creative ascent? Suppose that in every stage power in a lower 
form is lost as a condition of higher acquirement?
The loss of the living in being unable to assimilate the 
inorganic is compensated by the general gain of the animal over 
the plant; so with the mind thus gained. The ‘spirit,’ which ought 
to be evident and transparent to all, since it is the Air which the 
mind breathes, the pure atmosphere which pervades and vitalises 
it, has taken the form of gases which act morbidly, though 
with indirect (anaesthetic) benefit. Hence myth, superstition, 
mysticism, and all which obscurely stirs us, evoking schemes of 
doctrine and speculation, ecstasies and terrors of the ‘supernatural,’ 
heavens and hells.
We construct elaborate narratives and arguments, all 
clashing one with the other: we have gods Many or One: we 
dimly see here the Triadic order which unconsciously for the 
most part governs our thought; and speak, in the most ‘advanced’ 
of religions, of the Trinity, —always tending for reasons but little 
understood, to begin and end with a Triad. All this belongs to 
the Order, in its lowest form, of intoxication, in its higher form 
of exaltation like that produced by nitrous oxide or in the form of 
ecstasy produced by asceticism, by long fasting and by silent and 
solitary contemplation. Great things, to us ‘miraculous’ things, are 
thus brought about. But we do not understand them or even our 
own Holiness, Wholeness. We are but barely on the threshold of 
the life in which they become natural and normal as the highest 
link between us all, belonging to the categories of that experience 
which science can deal with. To the Christ they are entirely 
natural; and to live in the Christhood which man is here to rise 
into and share, is the illumination of this as yet obscure ascent of 
Life and its ‘blossom’ and ‘fruit.’ 
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14 August 1908 [untitled]
From all directions in which one’s mind and thought may radiate, 
the importance of the idea prompting the verbal prefix ‘trans-’ 
becomes more manifest, more clearly accentuated. Change of 
position and thus of view: realisation of unity in multiplicity: 
change of kind, of aspect, and of worth, as well as of number: 
distinction, that is, of quality involved not merely in difference 
of (relative) quantity but by position as well as by measure and 
number: these and more are indicated by the prefix ‘trans-.’ 
But here the chemist must help us instead of looking 
scornfully amused at our muddles of meaning, and practically 
saying, ‘the less said the better’ (which as yet is too painfully true 
in unnoticed directions). He is really the best preacher of the 
‘Trans-.’ And all his ‘transes-’ themselves need to be strictly and 
severely applied to the so-called ‘chemistry’ of mind. They turn 
over, into, out of. They begin with spatial transit and transfer.
Are we then to acquire new and infinitely cumbrous 
Dictionary of symbol and notation, as the chemist is obliged to do? 
Are we to imitate his enforced elaboration of technical formula, 
his enormous complexity of accumulative and distinctive symbol? 
No. For we have an unused or at least seldom used short-brain 
and short-thought and short-sense, compared to which even the 
chemist’s is ‘circumlocutory.’ The long way round, the labyrinthine 
path, the laborious collection of item, the minute analysis (still, 
even so, comparatively coarse, as abounding problems yet unsolved 
bear witness), only make more conspicuous the painful scarcity of 
the interpretation which has given Man his still infantile degree 
of domination of those conditions given him by Nature to master 
and to utilise by penetrative and practical simplification. (Here 
we need a word like gist, an admirable one).
Truth forbid that we should undervalue that power of 
mind which rivals its own products, the instruments ending 
in ‘scope.’ But not only are there many more ‘scopes’ to be 
mechanically constructed—as also many more tests to be applied 
and combinations to be effected—but it becomes more and more 
imperative that power to read one problem by the help of another; 
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to make one solution give birth to another, to apply elsewhere 
and otherwise some unexpected and fruitful result, should be 
enhanced by the normal development of that articulate system of 
sound and mark which so powerfully though unconsciously sways 
all our thinking and our doing. For language is only the supreme 
form of Expressive Action. And the play of this must in all its 
forms be at the very least as discriminative and as exquisitely true 
as the ‘play’ of the typical musician and even the ‘play’ of evolving 
vitality itself, or the ‘play’ of all natural forces. 
Now the possible Play of Speech spoken or written or 
otherwise conveyed, though far from being as yet attained or 
even in the right sense aimed at, surpasses all other. Thereby mind 
and thought, to borrow a phrase from the primitive chemist, 
precipitates a deposit of incalculable value.
Nature here, as usual, puts us to shame. The cloud, for 
instance, does full justice to Water, Air, Light and the ‘laws of 
gravitation.’ And it may do justice also to another call, the call of 
sense of beauty in us and of the unsounded significance of that 
‘nature’ which we so vaguely and inconsistently realise and express 
that we look upon it as in turn a cruel monster to be defeated, a 
healthy and virtuous norm, a purely mechanical system or order, 
and as the Divine Nature,—an unconscious rebuke to the ‘super-
natural’; for what can be super-divine?
Every flower and blade of grass, as each rock or pebble, 
does full justice to its theme and to its setting. So, in health, does 
our pulse, our contracting muscle, our nerve-thrill. Only in the 
Expression and Communication of this and all else of which 
we are conscious or call fact and truth; only in the articulate 
Translation of the dialects of experience, are we content needlessly 
and shamefully to fail. No fear but that at best there will be failure 
enough! But in Expressive Communication we have largely a 
gratuitous failure and the most disastrous one we can make. For 
life itself, like Nature and Mind, may be called—that is may be 
considered as—Expression: and we must grow to understand more 
worthily that of which it speaks to us and would faithfully reveal. 
In a deep sense indeed, we do in fact understand or rather under-
move; we move and stand under a heaven of reality mirrored in 
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the humblest drop or disk of polished metal in our hand or at 
our feet. Why do we aspire? How do we come to use the term 
aspiration? Because we are bound, as human, to be erect and to 
look upwards: and because we belong like our world to a sun; to a 
Solar centre. We may well speak of a sun of righteousness and of 
the light of the world. But we move in a double revolution, —the 
loyal and the trusty order of our orbit. In this connection, then, let 
us note, as an example, the inexcusable folly of using the idea of 
revolution, the very condition of our planetary Home’s appointed 
Way, of its benefit from its Sun, to designate ‘revolt,’ tending 
to destructive anarchy, mutiny or desertion. Here we see an 
instance of the work of mis-translation against which no protest 
is effectually raised; of a false type of analogy and comparative 
transference of an idea from one sphere of interest to another. We 
cannot of course do without this: there is a mass of examples to 
show that the man who protests that we can and must avoid the 
pitfalls of imagery and metaphor by abstaining from their use, 
is often the most flagrant offender. And he who does not only 
commit what he denounces; he does it in subtly falsifying ways, 
constantly overlooked or ignored. 
Significs will effectually test the relative of any and all 
forms of transference or transposition, of any process indeed 
which can be symbolised by the prefix ‘trans’-. Even in this 
case—one of uncounted thousands—we should gain by the 
simplifying, illuminating, results of applying consistently the 
method of Significs. This tries all things by the test of Sense. In 
what or which sense, on what ground, with what object, from 
what startpoint, with what reference are you working, thinking, 
speaking? What do you intend to convey, to induce, to effect, to 
suggest, to imply by your act, your attitude, your procedure or 
abstention or refusal; by speaking or declining to speak? And 
what is the essential significance of any of these activities and all 
others worthy the name? To what do they point, at what do they 
hint, what may they reveal?
20 December 1908
Question of the Limits of Possible Translation
Is it desirable to allow such terms as truth, honesty, virtue, holiness, 
love, good, to connote, by gradual vitiation through laxity, moral 
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or intellectual or both, forms of vice, adulteration or falsification? 
Is it not better when quite feasible—in fact when the natural and 
easy plan—to preserve a given line of association in expression, 
so that the man of the new generation may never find e.g. dirty 
or mean becoming the serious epithets for what he is normally to 
approve and admire; and such terms as noble and pure for what 
he is to despise, ridicule, even detest?
There are prevalent and tolerated mis-translations of 
this kind and scarce less monstrous, against which we cannot too 
strenuously protest. Better none than those. Indeed the present 
state of things, once perceived, is so intolerable and leads to such 
desperate tragedy of misconception and abortion of mental life, 
that there are times when one would almost welcome a general 
dumbness and agraphia so that we were reduced to gesture 
and attitude and to the resources of geometrical and numerical 
diagram and symbol.
There at least we seem still to be sanely consistent; we 
don’t call a triangle a square, or muddle up 2 with a 4, a 3 with a 5, 
although these lasts are tempting alike! The question here arises, 
how far expressive action has correspondingly deteriorated? 
As this is still largely natural and not conventional, we may 
think it invulnerable. But we pay a heavy price for refinements 
of civilisation which on the whole tend upwards and give us 
priceless brain-born privileges. And here also the question arises: 
How to keep on a rising line in character as well as in ability, 
without risking the loss of attunement with the order, the law, the 
tone, the pitch, the harmony, the ac-cord and con-cord, the true 
scales and spectrums, of the universe: how in short to avoid the 
analogue of squint, blunder, chaos,—failure.
The intellectual and moral ascent ought to really be 
ascent: but there is no subtle corruption than that which can 
be conveyed through a language allowed to rot, or to harbour 
parasites malignant only as out of really significant relation. If 
the corrupting process were a question of vulgarism or ignorance; 
if the priceless quality of significance did not, among those 
from whom we must naturally look for the typical examples of 
ideal and conscience in this matter, suffer so strangely from the 
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prevalent supineness and neglect, the protest of Significs would 
not be needed. But at present the evil is allowed to grow without 
check or even notice till many of the highest and purest forms of 
expression are killed out or degraded by unworthy contexts.
We are prompt to denounce vice in action and even 
ignore and even encourage. Indeed many a criminal may have 
begun by taking language ‘at its word’—at its face value—and 
seeing no ‘harm’ in deeds which reflect the words used in quite 
respectable circles! Many instances of such perversion are given 
elsewhere, and terms like ‘property’ and ‘marriage’ to say nothing 
of ‘murder’ and ‘falsehood’ are used in morally indefensible ways, 
though legal exigencies may up to a certain point excuse and even 
justify them in merely formal procedure.
Our ‘masters of style’ are indeed concerned with certain 
conventional canons of beauty and dignity, some of course in 
essential harmony with what is here submitted. But that harmony 
is mostly negatived or neutralised by needless sacrifice of aptness 
or consistency in illustrative or suggestive terms. Especially in 
verse—blank or rhymed—is this the case. We impose barriers 
on Sense or Meaning for the sake of sound and its rhythms as 
conveying or inducing emotion, translating this into written 
form. But it is possible for the sake of the luxury of emotion or 
even for that of mere pleasure, to taint the very sources of the 
highest human developments.
Our idealistic terms are not always so true to Nature and 
the real as in the case of the Heavenly, the ‘heaved,’ the Uplifted 
mind or thought, that which instinctively acknowledges its 
kinship—with its planet’s and its sun’s—to the starry motherhood 
of the cosmos into which, as ‘sky,’ with infant eyes we look… 
Abundant evidence of the crying need of a Significal 
Critique of language as we are content to teach it to each fresh 
generation, can be supplied. Meanwhile attention may be drawn 
to what appears at least broadly to be the fact; that our modern 
Western civilisation is the first and only instance on record of 
a helplessly falsified expression for accordingly adequate and 
creative activities.
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It is as though we are content to hobble in the shoes 
which fitted our infancy or to use arms and hands artificially 
distorted and partly paralysed.
Never did the advanced sections of the race more urgently 
need a normally organic language: never had we the conditions 
or more complete command over our expressive resources: 
articulate communication is every day extending its range and 
its importance, while modern science brings to the front the 
crying need of flawless accuracy and consistency, though as in 
the delicate ‘tuning’ of an instrument this ought to be the very 
opposite of a pedantic or priggish precision. So also does the 
enormous and ever-growing advance in invention of which the 
incipient ‘conquest of the air’ is a conspicuous instance.
No flaw, even the smallest, can be tolerated there. And 
yet invention can never be as speech is, at the very heart of all that 
is worthy to be called human life. Physical communication it but 
a mockery while mental communion remains in its present state. 
In invention we tolerate no flaws of any kind, since we realise 
the disaster which they must bring. But how often is mental and 
social disaster the consequence of unrealised or neglected flaws at 
the very heart of Expression!
14 December 1910 [untitled]
We must train ourselves to give examples (of course as yet crude 
and tentative only) of the Translations (interpretations through 
translation) which lie waiting for us throughout experience, when 
we have learnt to signify, and to apply that process normally. As 
yet we do not fully signify. We have not reached the true norm 
of significance. Hence our groping in jungles of mind, and 
collecting well-sifted bundles of bone and skin, and muscle and 
nerve &c. &c. out of which to construct marvellous dolls that 
speak and jibber. Hence our solemn reminders to each other that 
this or that achievement, however ‘ideal’ and practically desirable, 
is impossible for man and therefore an utopian dream. That is 
true: for unless we are all brought up to signify and interpret as 
we are born and here to do, we have to blow off useless ‘steam’ 
in visionary and mystical dreams and beliefs. A wretched man 
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even drinks to get the caricature by poison of a natural glory. For 
as it is, we are all gratuitously sub-natural. So we wander in a 
cultivated labyrinth in which we diligently labour to find clues: 
and when we have found these we use up the rest of our ‘time’ 
(our span and thread) in endless spinning of theory and equally 
endless tearing of the web in controversy that inevitably and 
unconsciously nullifies instead of enriching.
We think we mentally walk: but the left foot refutes 
the right, which returns the compliment. And so, oddly enough, 
we are ‘no forrader,’ though we can talk eloquently about the 
‘advance’ to which our muscular fatigue, though possibly caused 
by a treadmill, is witness, and enlarge on the folly of supposing 
that there is a ‘royal road’ to the solution of problems all the while 
there to be solved as we solve the problem of breathing.
There is indeed a ‘royal road,’ penetrating all our jungles 
like that made by a flash of lightning or a wireless message. But 
as we are, only the rare genius ever strikes it all. He has no time 
to show us what it indicates and whither it leads; or else he finds 
us putting him on pedestals or shrines, literalising his lessons, 
missing his points and issuing ‘editions de luxe’ of him; we have 
sometimes even tried to sterilise by our glosses his spring of 
fecundating significance. Why? Because our Native and Primal 
Sense has been trained out, snubbed out of us. So he may well be 
glad to go!
Here then is a ludicrously inept Example of what must 
become a sound and fruitful method of reading one form of 
experience—inductive and deductive and by the light of another. 
We will take, at hazard, a page out of Nature of Feb. 4th. 1909, 
p. 401, and make an elementary experiment as the children do, in 
application. 
There is a source of mental radiation which may well 
be called ‘Radium,’ since it represents the greatest discovered 
intensity of radio-active forces, one which energises and exploits 
the mental world. Mind as radio-active (which is a ‘planetary’ 
offshoot of a ‘solar,’ a central energy) emits light itself and is 
‘phosphorescent.’ It changes the colour of precious stones of 
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thought and ‘chemically’ turns the oxygen of experience into 
ozone. The ‘Water’ of life is converted into steam or ‘spirit’ (the 
‘peroxide of hydrogen’), and is again formed by recombining its 
constituents. This and similar transformations are effected by ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ rays of thought.
But the human Radium gives off an emanation (a gas 
or spirit) which produces heat (the first necessity of mental life). 
While the ‘life’ of this emanation (which we have yet to identify) 
is very short, that of human Radium may be typified at present as 
about 1750 years long as against less than 4 days. This indicates 
the proportion of significal to ordinary ‘thought’ in value and 
power. It probably indicates a transformation of elements which 
in pre-radiatic days would not only have seemed but have been 
fantastic. We speak of mental ‘depression’ which makes one’s 
despondent fears as heavy as lead. And as we are, this is an effect 
of human radium. That which supremely radiates irresistible 
power also supplies weight. And we need weighty thought and 
decision; as against dull or inert stupidity. 
Meantime, while there is a weedy crop of fascinating 
theories tending to choke the precious sprout of a nourishing and 
developing human growth, all that we can do as yet is to stimulate 
the central signifying function which is the essential condition of 
man’s recognition and attained command of the full use of his 
radio-active mind. At present he radiates but feebly or casually, 
and if at all, mainly from an usurpative ‘Self ’; but the latent force 
is there. We damp it down in childhood, substituting the partial 
paralysis of the present adult standard and average. We have to 
cherish every glint and germ of our Radio-active Humanity.
***
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ABSTRACT: Translation, Interpretation, and Common 
Meaning: Victoria Welby’s Significal Perspective — As she 
worked through the nineteenth century Victoria Welby elaborated 
a fascinating theory of translation based on her theory of sign 
and meaning, which she designated with the term significs. This 
means to say that, on the one hand, Welby’s theory of translation 
took account of the vastness and variety of the world of signs, 
therefore of the unbounded nature of translative-interpretive 
processes which cannot be limited to the mere transition from one 
language to another. The condition for interlingual translation in 
the human world is the larger context where translative processes 
converge with life processes and maybe push beyond in what 
would seem to be an unbounded cosmic dimension. On the other 
hand, that Welby should have related her translation theory to 
her theory of sign and meaning also implies that she founded her 
translation theory in a theory of value recognizing the inevitable 
importance of the latter when translating within a single 
language as much as across different languages in a plurilingual 
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and intercultural world. Ultimately, in the properly human world, 
to translate means to interpret, that is, to translate transfiguring 
and transvaluating significance.
RÉSUMÉ : Traduction, interprétation et signifié commun : 
la signifique chez Victoria Welby — Au XIXe siècle, Victoria 
Welby élabore une remarquable théorie de la traduction et 
propose pour cette nouvelle conception du signe et du sens le 
terme signifique. D’une part, cette théorie de la traduction explore 
le vaste monde du signe de même que la nature insondable des 
processus de traduction et d’interprétation qui, bien évidemment, 
ne peuvent se résumer à une simple transposition d’une langue 
à une autre. En effet, la traduction interlangue s’inscrit dans un 
contexte où les circonstances actuelles font en sorte que le cours de 
la vie et les processus de traductions convergent, nous propulsant 
au-delà de ce qui pourrait sembler être une dimension cosmique 
sans frontière. D’autre part, en établissant un rapport entre sa 
théorie de la traduction et sa théorie du signe et du sens, Welby 
laisse entendre que sa théorie de la traduction est aussi créée à 
partir d’une théorie des valeurs, reconnaissant l’importance de 
cette dernière en traduisant, au sein d’un univers plurilingue et 
interculturel, autant dans une même langue que dans des langues 
différentes. Dans un monde qui est propre à l’être humain, 
traduire, c’est interpréter, c’est-à-dire transfigurer et transvaluer 
la signifiance.
Keywords: significs, significance, value, interpretation, critical 
methodology.
Mots-clés : signifique, signifiance, valeur, interprétation, 
méthodologie critique.
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